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“DAMN THE TORPEDOES! FULL SPEED
AHEAD”:* THE FCC’S DECISION TO
DEREGULATE MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND
THE THREAT TO VIEWPOINT DIVERSITY
Matthew Keller**
“The beliefs which we have most warrant for have no safeguard to
rest on but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them
unfounded.”1
“Do you know how much ‘Friends’ costs? Can you be a mom-andpop operation and pay Jennifer Aniston the $1 million an episode
that produces that formula?”2
INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 2003, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission) voted to relax several of its media
ownership regulations.3 One of the proposed changes would allow,
* Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1044 (D.C. Cir.
2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002).
** Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.S., Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1997. The author wishes to thank his family for the enormous love
and support that makes this possible, and especially Lauren, whose love makes it
all worthwhile.
1
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 20 (Hackett Publishing Co. 1978)
(1859).
2
FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell, on how shows like the popular sitcom
Friends will be in jeopardy if giant media corporations are not allowed to own
more television stations. Frank James, FCC Chief Warns of Future Shock,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 07, 2003, at 11.
3
Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and
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for the first time since 1975, a single entity to own both a
newspaper and a television station in the same local market.4 A
second proposal would greatly increase the number of regional
markets in which a single owner could own two television stations
and would allow common ownership of even three stations in large
markets.5 A third proposed change would allow a single entity to
own television stations having a combined reach of 45 percent of
the national television audience.6
The proposed rule changes generated an outpouring of public
disapproval.7 One United States senator commented that “the
FCC’s action was one of the most complete cave-ins to corporate
interests I’ve ever seen by what is supposed to be a federal
Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets,
and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003)
[hereinafter The 2003 Order].
4
Id. at 46,312. The original newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule
prohibited “common ownership of a full-service broadcast station and a daily
newspaper” in the same market. Id. at ¶ 230; 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (2002). The
2003 Order repealed this rule. Id. at ¶ 247. This change will, according to
analysts, allow TV-newspaper mergers in approximately 180 local markets, in
which about 98 percent of the U.S. population lives. COOPER, MARK, MEDIA
OWNERSHIP AND DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL INFORMATION AGE 192 (2003),
available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blogs/cooper/archives/mediabooke. pdf
[hereinafter COOPER].
5
Id. at 46,294 ¶ 83. Under the old rules, TV duopolies (ownership of two
local stations) were allowed in about 60 markets that covered about two-thirds
of the national population. COOPER, supra note 4, at 192. The new rules would
allow duopolies and even triopolies in over 160 markets covering 95 percent of
the U.S. population. Id.
6
Id. at 46,328 ¶ 352. The previous limit was 35 percent. Id. This proposal
has since been rejected by Congress and the limit has been set by statute at 39
percent. See Stephen Labaton, Court Is Urged to Change Media Ownership
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at C14.
7
The reported number of public comments received by the FCC in
response to the vote varied widely, but all estimates were large. See Chelie
Pingree, The Big Media Monopoly, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at A26
(reporting that the FCC received over 2 million public comments, nearly all
against relaxing the rules); Anne C. Mulkern, Senate: Overturn FCC Rule On
Media Vote to Limit Ownership Defies Bush Veto Threat, DENVER POST,
September 17, 2003, at C-01 (reporting that “most” of the 750,000 comments
the FCC received opposed the changes).
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regulatory agency.”8 On September 16, 2003, the United States
Senate collectively responded to the proposed changes. By a vote
of 54-40, the Senate added a brief amendment to the appropriations
bill that would fund the FCC for 2004.9 The amendment read as
follows:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the Federal
Communications Commission relating to broadcast media
ownership . . . and such rule shall have no force or effect.10
The FCC attempted to support its rule changes on two separate
grounds. The Commission argued first that the changes were
legally required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.11
Specifically, the FCC found itself constrained by the fact that the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had interpreted that Act to
contain a “presumption in favor of repealing or modifying” media
ownership rules.12 Second, the FCC argued that the current level of
regulation was no longer required due to changes in the media
landscape.13
The rule changes adopted by the FCC on June 2 represent the
broadest deregulation of media ownership in decades and severely
limit the government’s ability to provide Americans with “the
8

Demetri Sevastopulof, Senate In Move to Overturn New FCC Rules,
LONDON FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at 2 (quoting Senator Byron Dorgan (DND)).
9
S. J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003); Stephen Labaton, FCC Plan to Ease
Curbs on Big Media Hits Senate Snag, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A1.
10
S. J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003) (emphasis added). The House of
Representatives had passed a similar amendment over a month earlier by a vote
of 400-21. See Christopher Stern & Jonathan Krim, House Votes to Prevent
Change in Media Rule, WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at A01.
11
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
12
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1048 (D.C. Cir.
2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002).
13
See The 2003 Order, supra note 3, at 46,286 ¶ 52. The Order noted that,
unlike the broadcast world in which the broadcast rules evolved, the modern
world is “characterized not by information scarcity, but by media abundance.”
Id.
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widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources.”14 Antagonistic and broad-ranging debate
over questions of public importance has long been considered an
indispensable element of a self-governing society. This idea has
had a lively existence apart from American law, and was perhaps
best expressed by John Stuart Mill in his classic treatise On
Liberty.15 Although viewpoint diversity was probably not foremost
in the Framers’ minds in 1776,16 it has come to be considered
14

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (stating that
“[the First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential
to the welfare of the public”).
15
See MILL, supra note 1, chapter II, Of the Liberty of Thought and
Discussion. Mill discussed at length the historical, philosophical, and moral
arguments against suppression of dissident ideas in a society. Id. Briefly, his
argument can be summarized in three parts. First, Mill suggested that, because
humans are fallible creatures, we can never know with absolute certainty
whether any of our views are true. Id. at 50. Therefore, “if any opinion is
compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be
true.” Id. Second, Mill noted both that “though the silenced opinion be an error,
it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth,” and that “the
general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth.”
Id. From this, he concluded, “it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that
the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.” Id. Finally, Mill
argued that, even if the “general or prevailing opinion” is in fact the whole truth,
it is necessary to frequently reaffirm that truth by testing it against dissident
viewpoints. Id. Otherwise, Mill suggested, such truths would be held by the
people “in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its
rational grounds.” Id.
16
See Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC
Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 404 (1989). Emord argues that
the Framers of the Constitution did not envision the First Amendment as a
protector of viewpoint diversity. Id. The changed circumstances of public
discourse since 1776, however, may in part explain the Supreme Court’s
growing concern with protection of a diversity of views. See Owen M. Fiss,
Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410-13 (1986)
[hereinafter Fiss]. Fiss points out that we are no longer living in times where
everyone has more or less equal access to public fora. Id. As he points out,
“more is required . . . than a soapbox, a good voice, and the talent to hold an
audience.” Id. For a general discussion of the Framers’ understanding of the
First Amendment, see Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First
Amendment, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 1156 (1986); Alexander Meiklejohn, What Does
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“central” to the Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis.17 In
the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, arguably the
greatest (at least the most well-known) statement of the importance
of public debate is Justice Holmes’ famous “marketplace of ideas”
discussion in Abrams v. United States: “the best test of truth is the
power of [a] thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”18 Beyond Holmes, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed the principle that the First Amendment protects broad
public debate.19 The policy choices underlying the FCC’s
deregulation on June 2 sell this First Amendment principle short in
the pursuit of commercially successful entertainment.20
This note attempts to provide some context for the FCC’s
decision to deregulate on June 2 and offers a critique of that
decision. Part I provides a brief history of media regulation. It
tracks the emergence of two strands of regulation, one focusing on
broadcast content and the other on structural regulation of media
ownership. Fueled in part by emerging law and economics
the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461 (1953).
17
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994).
18
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Justice
Brandeis went further along these lines, pointing out not only the value but the
citizen’s duty of public discussion in noting “that the greatest menace to freedom
is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should
be a fundamental principle of the American government.” Whitney, 274 U.S. at
375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
19
See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 663 (“[A]ssuring that the public has
access to a multiplicity of information sources is governmental purpose of the
highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.”);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (stating that “[the First]
Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public”).
20
COOPER, supra note 4, at 21. Cooper points out that the free-market
model favored by the FCC’s new rules “favors entertainment at the expense of
information.” Id. While such a model is “splendid” for providing goods and
services such as entertainment, it fails to produce “the kind of debate that
constantly renews the capacity of a people for self-determination.” Id. (citing
Owen M. Fiss, Essays Commemorating the One Hundredth Anniversary of the
Harvard Law Review: Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987)).
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scholarship, broadcast regulation began to wane in the late 1970s
and continued on a downward trend, culminating in the passage of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.21 Part II discusses the two
major cases interpreting the section of the 1996 Act dealing with
media ownership.22 It relates how the FCC took advantage of the
deregulatory language of those opinions23 by rushing through its
rulemaking procedures, heedless of both public outcry and a
judicial modification of its earlier deregulatory language. Part II
concludes by summarizing the continuing battle in Congress and
the courts following the June 2 vote.
In Part III, an analysis is offered which attempts to discredit the
FCC’s legal justification for its rule changes, and to attack the
remaining policy justifications as misguided and focused on the
wrong underlying interests. The analysis proposes that the D.C.
Court of Appeals decisions in Fox and Sinclair, upon which the
FCC relied heavily to justify its rule changes, may have given a
deregulatory gloss to the media ownership portion of the 1996 Act
that was not intended by Congress.24 The court itself seemed to
21

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56

(1996).
22

Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir.
2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC,
284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
23
See Fox, 280 F.3d at 1044. The title of this note is taken from the
statement made, in dicta, in the Fox opinion that the deregulatory intent of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 could be likened to “Farragut’s order at the
battle of Mobile Bay (‘Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead.’).” Id.
24
See Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell, 2002 Biennial
Regulatory Review, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ FCC03-127A3.doc (released July 2, 2003) [hereinafter Powell Statement]. The FCC
Chairman’s statement accompanying the rule changes repeatedly asserts that
deregulation of the broadcast rules was mandated by the Fox and Sinclair courts.
Id. In the statement’s introduction, Chairman Powell claimed that “[k]eeping the
rules exactly as they are, as some so stridently suggest, was not a viable option”
and that “[w]ithout today’s surgery, the rules would assuredly have met a swift
death [in the courts.]” Id. at 1. The very next section of the Chairman’s
statement begins: “Critical to understanding our actions, is an understanding of
the court’s view of Congress’ charge to the Commission in the 1996
Telecommunications Act.” Id. (emphasis added). Later, the Chairman claims
that “[r]ecent court decisions have established a high hurdle for the Commission
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recognize this, later modifying the Fox decision by removing some
of that opinion’s deregulatory language.25 The Fox and Sinclair
opinions taken as a whole do not support the FCC’s conclusion
that those opinions required the comprehensive deregulation
promulgated by the Commission on June 2, 2003. Part III thus
concludes that the FCC’s insistence that these opinions mandated
further deregulation was unjustified. The opinions left the FCC
with the broad discretion it has historically held to promulgate
rules in the public interest. Therefore, the decision to further
release the ownership of broadcast television stations to market
forces was the FCC’s alone. The analysis concludes that this
decision unwisely risks substantial damage to the public discourse
that is one of the essential foundations of our democracy. If the
FCC’s new rules are allowed to take effect, the resulting
concentration of communicative power into a handful of giant forprofit media corporations will further weaken this foundation.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEDIA REGULATION

A scheme of government regulation of electronic broadcasting
was originally established in the early 20th century to solve the
novel technical problems raised by the new medium of radio.26
State exertion of this power to guide the medium, however, soon
began to take on political undertones. Rules soon appeared that
dealt not with technical matters, but with both the structure of the
marketplace of broadcasters and with the content of broadcasts.27
to maintain a given broadcast ownership regulation.” Id. at 2.
25
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
26
See National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-13
(discussing early efforts by government to deal with the new technical problems
posed by radio technology).
27
See id. at 216-17. The NBC case dealt with a broadcaster’s challenge to
“chain broadcasting” rules, discussed more fully in Part I.C, infra. Although the
chain broadcasting rules could not be justified on technical grounds alone the
Court nevertheless found them to be valid under Federal law, holding that the
FCC’s “licensing function cannot be discharged . . . merely by finding that there
are no technological objections to the granting of a license.” Id. at 216. The
Court made the observation that, if limited to technical considerations, “how
could the Commission choose between two applicants for the same facilities,
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Both types of rules remained in effect until the early 1980s, after
which a new administration with broad deregulatory proclivities
began to dismantle the old regulatory regime.28 Content
regulations, which had raised First Amendment concerns from the
beginning, were the first to go.29 Structural ownership regulations
remained, but were the subject of a rising level of scrutiny by those
who favored greater marketplace control of the television and radio
station market.30 Deregulation continued into the nineties,
culminating in the passage of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.31 The 1996 Act revised national telecommunications policy
by encouraging greater competition and private investment in new
technology through deregulation.32 The 1996 Act also included
further deregulation of broadcast ownership, causing some to
question the wisdom of market control of the core democratic
function of dissemination of public information.33
each of whom is financially and technically qualified to operate a station?” Id. at
216-17. See infra Part I.B for further discussion of this point.
28
See PATRICIA AUFERHIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, 26 (1999) (“The election
of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was a watershed for deregulatory action.”); see infra
Part I.E (discussing the influence of Law and Economics on the Reagan
administration and telecommunications policy in particular in the 1980s).
29
See, e.g., In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules
and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of
Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145 (1985) (repudiating the fairness
doctrine, which required stations to broadcast competing viewpoints of public
issues). See infra Part I.D for further discussion of the fairness doctrine and
other content-based regulations.
30
See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982). Fowler, a former FCC
Commissioner, was an ardent and influential advocate for market control of
broadcasting. Id. See infra Part I.E for further discussion of this point.
31
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
32
Id. The stated purpose of the Act was to “promote competition and
reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment
of new telecommunications technologies.” Id.
33
See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing adverse public, Congressional, and
judicial reactions to broadcast deregulation).
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A. Original Justifications for Regulation
The initial motive for government regulation of radio was
predominantly technical in nature; laws were needed to prevent the
interference between, and resulting incoherence of, radio
broadcasts transmitted on the same frequency.34 Therefore, while
newspaper publication has always been largely left to private
competition in the market, from the very beginning the broadcast
media evolved under what has been called a “trusteeship” model.35
As large numbers of broadcasters began to use radio commercially,
the increasing competition for the limited space on the airwaves
resulted in chaos.36 After appeals to broadcasters to regulate
themselves to avoid interference went unheeded, several
government officials, including then-President Calvin Coolidge,
called upon Congress to solve the problem with appropriate
legislation.37
B. Technical Regulation Yields to Political Regulation
Congress established the nation’s first comprehensive
regulatory scheme for broadcasting with the Radio Act of 1927.38
The Radio Act established the Federal Radio Commission (FRC)
34

See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969) (“Without
government control, the medium would be of little use because of the cacophony
of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard.”).
35
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, at 216-17 (1982). “Governmental
guidance in broadcast decision-making, the fundamental characteristic of the
trusteeship model, sets it apart from a marketplace approach.” Id.
36
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375.
37
See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943). In a message to
Congress delivered on December 7, 1926, President Coolidge warned that “the
whole service of this most important public function has drifted into such chaos
as seems likely, if not remedied, to destroy its great value.” Id. Some writers
have suggested that, unlike the press, early government regulation of radio was
also tolerated because the technology was first used for military, safety, and
rescue purposes, traditional areas of legitimate state control. See BRUCE M.
OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 88 (1975); Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, at 213.
38
The Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1163 (1927).
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and delegated to that body the responsibility of licensing
broadcasters.39 Licensing under the Radio Act sought to avoid
interference,40 and initially FRC regulation centered on this issue.41
Because licenses were issued to broadcasters by the FRC free of
charge, however, the resulting demand for licenses quickly grew
larger than the available radio frequency spectrum could
accommodate.42 The Commission needed some way of
determining who would receive the limited number of licenses and
for how long they would hold them.43 The standard provided in the
Radio Act of 1927 to guide the Commission in these decisions was
“as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.”44 This
short, vague phrase added a discretionary political component to
broadcast regulation that would later become the source of great
power for the Commission.45
39

See The Radio Act of 1927, § 3 (establishing the Commission); § 4
(establishing criteria for issuing licences).
40
The Radio Act of 1927, § 4(f). “Interference” is defined by the FCC as
“[t]he effect of unwanted energy due to one or a combination of emissions,
radiations, or inductions upon reception in a radiocommunication system,
manifested by any performance degradation, misinterpretation, or loss of
information which could be extracted in the absence of such unwanted energy.”
47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2004).
41
OWEN, supra note 37, at 89 (“Initial concern was centered on technical
questions of interference.”).
42
Id.
43
Id.; The Radio Act of 1927 also established license application and
renewal procedures. Licensees were required to renew their station licenses with
the FRC periodically. See The Radio Act of 1927, §§ 9-14.
44
The Radio Act of 1927, § 4.
45
See Benjamin M. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on Content: Does
it Matter?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L. J. 755, 758 (1995). “By far the most
powerful six words in the history of [broadcast] regulation must be ‘the public
interest, convenience, and necessity.’” Id.; FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309
U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (referring to the public-interest standard of the Radio and
Communications Acts as “a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by
the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy”);
JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 263 (5th ed. 2003) (“The authorization to the FCC to grant broadcast
licenses based on a showing of ‘public interest, convenience, and necessity’
obviously leaves the agency a lot of room for deciding what these terms
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Seven years later, the foregoing provisions of the Radio Act of
1927 were incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934.46
The Communications Act of 1934 expanded the role of the FRC to
include regulation of communication by wire and, as a result, the
name of the Commission was changed to the Federal
Communications Commission.47 The Communications Act of 1934
did not, however, alter the “public interest” standard under which
the FCC was to issue broadcast licenses.48
C. Structural Regulation in the Public Interest
The history of the broadcast regulations promulgated by the
FRC (and later the FCC) pursuant to authority granted by the
Radio and Communications Acts can be separated into two
categories: structural rules and behavioral rules.49 Structural rules
define “who may own outlets and how many they may own.”50 The
FCC has historically justified its structural rules on the grounds
that diverse ownership of broadcast stations promotes viewpoint
diversity.51 The Supreme Court in FCC v. National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting agreed that this justification was a
mean.”).
46
The Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
47
The Communications Act of 1934, § 4.
48
See The Communications Act of 1934, §§ 307, 309 (ordering the FCC to
grant and renew broadcast licenses to applicants “if public convenience, interest,
or necessity will be served thereby”).
49
See Daniel L. Brenner, Ownership and Content Regulation in Merging
and Emerging Media, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1996). Brenner’s
classification of media regulations into “structural” and “behavioral” categories
is utilized throughout this note.
50
Id. at 1015.
51
See Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of Commission’s
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television
Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1050 (1975).
“The significance of ownership from the standpoint of ‘the widest possible
dissemination of information’ lies in the fact that ownership carries with it the
power to select, to edit, and to choose the methods, manner and emphasis of
presentation, all of which are a critical aspect of the Commission’s concern with
the public interest.” Id.
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reasonable interpretation of the “public interest” standard.52
One example of a long-standing structural rule is a national
ownership limitation. From almost the beginning of broadcast
regulation in this country, the FCC has, in one form or another,
limited the total number of stations a broadcaster may own
nationwide.53 At the time it was originally promulgated, the stated
purpose of the national ownership restriction “was twofold: (1) to
encourage diversity of ownership in order to foster the expression
of varied viewpoints and programming, and (2) to safeguard
against undue concentration of economic power.”54
Other structural regulations have limited media ownership on a
local level, either by prohibiting cross-ownership (defined as
common ownership of either a radio station or a newspaper and a
television station in the same community),55 or by limiting the
number of commonly-owned television stations in a local market.56
So-called “chain broadcasting” regulations at one point went past
limiting common ownership to prohibiting the ability of
independent broadcasters to contract with one another in ways

52

436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978). Indeed, the NCCB court made it clear that
First Amendment concerns were an important consideration in the FCC’s
interpretation of the public interest standard. “The ‘public interest’ standard,”
the court noted, “necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles.”
Id. The Court further held that an individual’s right to speak does not trump the
collective right of all Americans to speak. “[T]here is no unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to
speak, write, or publish.” Id. at 799 (internal citations omitted).
53
See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up On Democracy,
54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 865 (2002) [hereinafter Baker]. “Regulation began in the
1940s, when the FCC explicitly limited [nationwide] ownership to six FM radio
stations and three television stations.” Id.; see also In the Matter of Amendment
of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and
Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984) (giving a history of the
national ownership restrictions) [hereinafter The 1984 Order].
54
The 1984 Order, 100 F.C.C.2d at 17 ¶ 3.
55
See, e.g., Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and
Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046
(1975).
56
See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1998). The name of the original local station
ownership rule was the “duopoly rule.”
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which limited their freedom to broadcast diverse programming.57
Several of these structural rules have been challenged by
licensees seeking to increase ownership. Those challenges that
have reached the Supreme Court have been denied.58 In 1943, the
Court upheld chain broadcasting regulations in NBC v. United
States.59 The NBC decision construed the Communications Act as
providing the FCC broad authority to regulate licensees in pursuit
of the public interest.60 The Court also explicitly held that the
exercise of such authority to regulate broadcasters was not a First
Amendment violation.61
In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
several broadcasting and newspaper associations challenged the
FCC’s cross-ownership ban.62 The Supreme Court rejected the
challenge, reaffirming the broad authority of the FCC to regulate in

57

See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 198-210 (1943) (summarizing
eight of the FCC’s “chain broadcasting” rules). “Chain broadcasting,” defined in
the Communications Act as “the simultaneous broadcasting of an identical
program by two or more connected stations,” became the subject of regulation
after FCC studies revealed the extent to which the national networks (NBC,
CBS, and Mutual) had used the practice to dominate the radio market. Id. at 198
(citing FCC studies that showed, inter alia, that “NBC and CBS together
controlled more than 85% of the total night-time wattage, and [that] the
broadcast business of the three national network companies amounted to almost
half of the total business of all stations in the United States”). The FCC, while
recognizing that chain broadcasting provided “benefits and advantages to both
the listening public and to broadcast station licensees,” also asserted its
responsibility “to see that practices which adversely affect the ability of
licensees to operate in the public interest are eliminated.” Id.
58
See, e.g., FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978);
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
59
319 U.S. 190 (1943).
60
Id. at 219. “In the context of the developing problems to which it was
directed, the [Communications] Act gave the Commission not niggardly but
expansive powers.” Id.
61
Id. at 227. “The standard [of the Communications Act] provided for the
licensing of stations was the ‘public interest, convenience, or necessity.’ Denial
of a station license on that ground, if valid under the [Communications] Act, is
not a denial of free speech.” Id.
62
FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978).

KELLERMACRO.DOC

904

4/23/2004 1:20 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

the public interest recognized in NBC and other cases.63 In
National Citizens Committee, one of the challenges made to the
rule was that the prohibition of cross-ownership was unreasonable
because the FCC had not sufficiently established that the rule
contributed to an increased diversity of broadcast viewpoints.64
The Court held that the FCC had acted rationally, notwithstanding
the inconclusiveness of the rulemaking record, because “[d]iversity
and its effects are . . . elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone
measured without making qualitative judgments objectionable on
both policy and First Amendment grounds.”65 The Court, quoting
the FCC’s own rationale for believing that diverse ownership was a
rational proxy for diversity of viewpoints, upheld and seconded the
FCC’s judgment that structural regulations were necessary to
maintain truly diverse viewpoints.66
D. Behavioral Regulation in the Public Interest
As distinguished from structural regulations, behavioral media
regulations have been defined as “controlling what’s
communicated”67 and necessarily involve direct government
regulation of broadcast content.68 Early attempts by the FRC (and
later the FCC) to issue licenses pursuant to the “public
convenience, interest, or necessity” standard occasionally required
the Commission to make licensing decisions based on program
content. For example, in KFKB v. Federal Radio Commission, a
broadcaster appealed an FRC decision denying renewal of his
63

Id. at 793-94.
Id. at 796.
65
Id. at 796-97.
66
See NCCB, 436 U.S. at 785, 797. “In these circumstances, the
Commission was entitled to rely on its judgment, based on experience, that ‘it is
unrealistic to expect true diversity from a commonly owned station-newspaper
combination. The divergency of their viewpoints cannot be expected to be the
same as if they were antagonistically run.’” Id. at 797 (internal citations
omitted).
67
Brenner, supra note 30, at 1013.
68
Id. at 1014; see also Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC,
77 HARV. L. REV. 701 (1964).
64
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license on content-based grounds.69 Specifically, the denial was
based on a finding that the content of the broadcaster’s programs
was “inimical to the public health and safety, and for that reason
was not in the public interest.”70 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
found on review that denial of license renewal on this basis was
not rightly considered censorship, and was a valid execution of the
Commission’s statutorily-defined mandate to allocate licenses in
the public interest.71
Behavioral regulation also provided the foundation for the
“fairness doctrine,” which for decades required licensed
broadcasters to allow voices on all sides of important public issues
to be heard.72 The fairness doctrine evolved from two interrelated
strands of prior FRC and FCC “public interest” regulation: first,
the requirement that broadcasters give adequate coverage to public
issues73, and second, that coverage on such issues be “fair” in the
sense that it accurately reflect opposing views.74
69

KFKB v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
Id. KFKB involved an entrepreneurial physician who hosted a radio show
in which listeners would inform the doctor of their ailments and ask for a
diagnosis and suggested treatment. Id. As one might expect, the recommended
remedy for the vast majority of these ailments was one of the doctor’s own
preparations. Id. Looking with disfavor upon this practice, the FRC declined the
doctor’s application for renewal of his license, stating that, “[w]hile it is to be
expected that a licensee of a radio broadcasting station will receive some
remuneration for serving the public with radio programs, at the same time the
interest of the listening public is paramount, and may not be subordinated to the
interests of the station licensee.” Id.
71
Id. at 673 (“In considering the question whether the public interest,
convenience, or necessity will be served by a renewal of appellant’s license, the
commission has merely exercised its undoubted right to take note of appellant’s
past conduct, which is not censorship.”).
72
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (discussing
the origin and history of the fairness doctrine); see also Great Lakes Broad. Co.,
3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929) (stating the FRC’s view that “the public
interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views,
and the commission believes that the principle applies . . . to all discussions of
issues of importance to the public”).
73
See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377 (citing United Broad. Co., 10 F.C.C. 515
(1945)).
74
See id. (citing New Broad. Co., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 258 (1950)). In 1985,
70
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For years, the FCC used its power to award and deny licenses
under the fairness doctrine as a way of shaping program content.75
In 1946 the FCC issued a “Blue Book” outlining the Commission’s
programming policy, recognizing the need for “broadcasters to air
programs of community interest.”76 The Blue Book stated that the
FCC would give “particular consideration” to four types of content
programming behaviors: (1) programs unsupported by advertising;
(2) local live programs; (3) public issues discussions; and (4)
efforts to limit hourly advertising.77 In 1960, the FCC issued a
Program Policy Statement that also defined several types of
preferred programming content.78
In 1967, the FCC promulgated rules requiring a station to offer
free air time to political candidates and private citizens, affording
both the opportunity to respond to campaign messages or personal
attacks broadcast on that station.79 As opposed to the general
principles of the fairness doctrine, the 1967 rules specifically
required broadcasters to involuntarily cede their broadcast facilities
the FCC described the fairness doctrine as requiring broadcast license holders
“[(1)] to provide coverage of vitally important controversial issues of interest in
the community served by the licensees, [and (2)] to provide a reasonable
opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues.”
Report Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 146 (1985).
75
See Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARV. L. REV.
701 (1964).
76
See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, at 215; Brenner, supra note 49, at
1013 n.27.
77
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, at 215.
78
See En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960); Fowler &
Brenner, supra note 30, at 216. The statement mentioned the following as
integral to the public interest: opportunity for local self-expression, development
and use of local talent, children programming, religious programming,
educational programming, public affairs programming, editorialization by
licensees, political broadcasts, agricultural programming, news programming,
weather and market services, sports programming, service to minority groups.
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, n.44; see also Brenner, supra note 49, at 1013
(describing the practical application of the statement as “obligat[ing] a
broadcaster to develop a diversity rich program environment—if the broadcaster
expected to have its license easily renewed”).
79
33 Fed. Reg. 5362 (1967).
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to others in certain situations.80 Consequently, broadcasters
challenged the rules as unconstitutional abridgements of the
freedoms of speech and press.81 In one of the ensuing lawsuits, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck down the FCC
rules as violations of the broadcasters’ First Amendment rights.82
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision and upheld the FCC
rules.83 The Court held that the personal attack and political
editorializing rules were merely more precise reiterations of the
fairness doctrine.84 As such, the rules were valid to the same extent
as the doctrine itself.85 The Court also reiterated the argument
made in NBC that, because radio spectrum was limited,
government regulation of the speech broadcast thereon was
proper.86 Therefore, given the limited spectrum of frequencies, the
Court found that content-based rules requiring individual licensees
to air viewpoints that they did not hold were constitutional.87 This
80

Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 378 (“[The 1967 rules] differ from the general
fairness requirement that issues be presented, and presented with coverage of
competing views, in that the broadcaster does not have the option of presenting
the attacked party’s side himself or choosing a third party to represent that
side.”).
81
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (1967).
82
See Radio Television News Directors Ass’n v. U.S., 400 F.2d 1002, 1020
(7th Cir. 1968) (“In view of the vagueness of the Commission’s rules, the
burden they impose on licensees, and the possibility they raise of both
Commission censorship and licensee self-censorship, we conclude that the
personal attack and political editorial rules would contravene the First
Amendment.”).
83
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375.
84
Id.
85
See id. (“Believing that the specific application of the fairness doctrine in
Red Lion, and the promulgation of the [rules at issue] are both authorized by
Congress and enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and press
protected by the First Amendment, we hold them valid and constitutional.”).
86
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1948). “Unlike other modes of
expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique
characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to
governmental regulation.” Id.
87
See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (“Because of the scarcity of radio
frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor
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view, which came to be known as the “scarcity doctrine,” became
the primary justification given for government regulation of
broadcast content.88
E. Enter Law and Economics 89
Law and economics scholarship has applied economic
principles to media regulation.90 The law and economics
movement, grounded in ideas of personal freedom as a route to
of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium.”).
88
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 30, at 221 (“Spectrum scarcity always has
been the cornerstone of the justification for . . . reducing First Amendment
protection for broadcasters.”).
89
See Charles K. Rowley, Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of
Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 125 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989). “Law and
economics” can be defined as “the application of economic theory and
econometric methods to examine the formation, structure, processes and impact
of law and legal institutions.” Id. Starting in the 1970s, law and economics
scholars began disseminating articles on a wide variety of legal issues. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 438 (1995) (“The years since 1970
have witnessed an expanding torrent of scholarly writing across the full range of
law and economics.”). By the end of the 1980s, the effects of this scholarship
were palpable in a wide array of practice areas. See William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study,
36 J. LAW & ECON. 385, 386 (1993) (noting the many areas of law in which
economic influences are “strong”); see also William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust
Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust
Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413 (1990); Brenner, supra note 49, at 1019 n.66.
90
See OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA
STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1975). The law and economics
perspective sometimes cuts against the grain of prevailing legal rules. Mr.
Owen, an economist by vocation, apologizes in his foreword for not giving the
“full sympathy to the weight of precedent and to the limits of judicial
legislation” that a lawyer normally would. Id. at xix. Unfortunately, the practice
of not giving due weight to precedent is not always limited to non-lawyers.
Some prominent law and economics-minded jurists have been accused of the
same fault. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 57 (2001)
(discussing an amici curiae brief filed by twenty-one state attorneys general
asking the Supreme Court to review a Seventh Circuit antitrust decision and
arguing that the circuit, in cases decided by Judges Richard Posner and Frank
Easterbrook, was ignoring Supreme Court precedent in order to find in favor of
defendant businesses).
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maximized social utility, ideally favors no government regulation
of broadcasters at all.91 If any regulation must be tolerated,
structural rules are preferred to content-based regulations.92
In 1982 FCC Chairman Mark Fowler published an article
calling for total deregulation of the broadcast media in favor of
market control.93 Fowler believed that the marketplace was a more
reliable arena than the FCC for discovering the public interest.94
Fowler’s calls for complete deregulation were not successful, but
the FCC clearly began to focus on the “public interest” from an
economic efficiency perspective.95 Reflecting this ideological shift,
FCC analyses of media mergers began to take on the tone of
antitrust proceedings, focusing more on preventing harmful
economic consolidation in broadcasting and less on dictating
content.96 This was a marked break from its earlier, more
91

See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849, 1861 n.48 (1987). Radin points out the similarities between modern day
law-and-economics scholars and classical utilitarians. Id.
92
See OWEN, supra note 90, at xix (noting the difference between the
traditional legislative and judicial tendency to “remedy inequities by imposing
behavioral sanctions and constraints on the process by which decisions are
reached” and the economist’s focus on “seek[ing] an organizational structure
that will provide internal incentives to decentralized decision makers, which will
lead to actions having some desirable attributes such as efficiency and fairness.”
(emphasis added).
93
Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 207 (1982). Chairman Fowler argued for
the removal of public interest obligations from broadcasters. Id. at 209 (“Our
thesis is that the perception of broadcasters as community trustees should be
replaced by a view of broadcasters as marketplace participants.”).
94
Id. at 209-10 (“Instead of defining public demand and specifying
categories of programming to serve this demand, the Commission should rely on
the broadcasters’ ability to determine the wants of their audiences through the
normal mechanisms of the marketplace.”).
95
See PATRICIA AUFERHIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 27 (1999) (describing FCC
actions in the early 1980s as “mov[ing] aggressively from a social equity to an
economic efficiency objective”).
96
See Baker, supra note 53, at 856 (“The presently dominant approach to
[broadcast] mergers . . . seems to be a Chicago School interpretation that focuses
almost exclusively on economic, primarily efficiency, concerns.”). As opposed
to merger analysis from a “marketplace of ideas” perspective, antitrust analysis
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qualitative “political” analyses.97 The increasing dominance of
structural analysis was highlighted when, in 1985, the FCC
officially repudiated the fairness doctrine.98 The FCC justified its
abandonment of the fairness doctrine on the grounds that scarcity
was no longer a problem in mass communications.99 Although it
took another fifteen years, the 1967 rules requiring free response
time to personal attacks and political editorials, upheld in Red
Lion, were judicially vacated in 2000.100
In combination with the retreat from behavioral regulation and
the increasing dominance of structural regulation, there was also a
general relaxation of antitrust scrutiny in all industries throughout
the 1980s under the Reagan administration.101 The overall result of
these changes was that the public interest in broadcasting was
increasingly placed into the “invisible hand” of the market.102
is based on the “dominant, arguably exclusive, aim ‘that mergers should not be
permitted to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise’ in order
to prevent ‘a transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers or a misallocation of
resources.’” Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Guidelines).
97
See Brenner, supra note 49, at 1018 (“[S]ince the 1970s, there’s been a
marked shift away from analysis that includes political considerations.”). It
seems clear that the term “political” in this context means “non-economic.”
98
In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and
Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 147 (1985) (“[W]e no longer believe that the
fairness doctrine, as a matter of policy, serves the public interest.”).
99
Id. at 197. “[W]e have witnessed explosive growth in various
communications technologies. We find the information marketplace of today . . .
provides the public with suitable access to the marketplace of ideas so as to
render the fairness doctrine unnecessary.” Id.
100
See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (directing the FCC to immediately repeal the personal attack
and political editorial rules).
101
See Brenner, supra note 49, at 1020 (“The general view of antitrust
enforcement during the Reagan years was to relax the merger and acquisition
standards for all industries, including media.”); see also AUFERHIDE, supra note
95, at 26 (“The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was a watershed for
deregulatory action.”).
102
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book IV Chapter II, Of Restraints upon the Importation
from Foreign Countries of Such Goods as Can Be Produced at Home (1776).
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F. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The deregulatory movement in mass media regulation
continued into the 1990s, highlighted by Congress’ passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.103 This Act took a deregulatory
approach to all facets of federal communications policy.104
Specifically, in terms of television ownership regulations, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 immediately relaxed several of
the FCC rules then in effect. First, the Act eliminated the
nationwide limit on station ownership and raised the national
audience reach cap from 25 to 35 percent.105 The Act also allowed
for greater affiliation between independent stations and television
networks.106 Finally, the Act eliminated an FCC prohibition on
cross-ownership of a broadcast network and a cable system.107
In addition to these immediate changes, section 202(h) of the
Act ordered the FCC to conduct reviews of all ownership rules
every two years to “determine whether any of such rules are
necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.”108
Section 202(h) ordered the Commission to “repeal or modify any
regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest.”109
Smith is credited with the idea that the public interest may best be served by a
government policy of laissez-faire. Smith hypothesized that an “invisible hand”
would cause private individuals’ self-interested efforts to also benefit society. Id.
(“He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention . . . . By
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”).
103
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
104
Id. The first line of the massive Act describes itself as “An Act To
promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and
higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” Id.
105
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(c)(1).
106
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(e).
107
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(f)(1).
108
See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h).
109
Id. The full text of § 202(h) stated:
The Commission shall review its rules adopted pursuant to this section
and all of its ownership rules biennially as part of its regulatory reform
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II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
1996
In 1998, after the first “biennial” review conducted pursuant to
section 202(h) of the 1996 Act, the FCC decided to substantially
maintain three of its rules: the National Television Station
Ownership (“NTSO”) rule,110 the Cable/Broadcast Cross
Ownership (“CBCO”) rule,111 and the Local Ownership Order
(“LOO”).112 In response, some of the nation’s largest TV
broadcasters challenged these rules on the ground that the 1996
Act required them to be repealed.
A. Big Media113 Takes Advantage of the Act—The Fox and
review under § 11 of the Communications Act of 1934 and shall
determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest
as the result of competition. The Commission shall repeal or modify
any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest.
Id.
110

47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (2004). As described in Fox Television Stations,
Inc. v. FCC, “[t]he NTSO rule prohibits any entity from controlling television
stations the combined potential audience reach of which exceeds 35% of the
television households in the United States.” Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002).
111
47 C.F.R. § 76.501(a) (2004). “The CBCO rule prohibits a cable
television system from carrying the signal of any television broadcast station if
the system owns a broadcast station in the same local market.” Fox, 280 F.3d at
1035 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
112
64 Fed. Reg. 50,651 (Sept. 17, 1999). The Local Ownership Order
relaxed the constraints of the “duopoly” rule, a long-standing FCC prohibition
on common ownership of more than one television station in a local market.
Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 152-55 (2002). Under the
Order, common ownership of local television stations was permitted, provided
that two conditions were met: (1) “one of the stations is not among the four
highest-ranked stations in the market,” and (2) “eight independently owned, fullpower and operational television stations (commercial and noncommercial) will
remain post-merger.” Id. at 155.
113
It is helpful at this point to briefly mention the fact that American
broadcasting is dominated by five corporations: News Corporation (owner of
Fox Network, 34 TV stations nationwide and other assorted media businesses),
General Electric (owner of NBC, Telemundo, and Paxson networks, 14 TV
stations, cable and other businsses), Disney (owner of ABC network, 10 TV
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Sinclair Cases
Several major broadcasters, dissatisfied by the FCC’s decision
to maintain the NTSO, CBCO, and LOO, challenged the rules in
court.114 The objections to the NTSO and CBCO rules were
consolidated in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC.115 The
challenge to the LOO was disposed of in Sinclair Broadcast
Group, Inc. v. FCC.116 The Fox decision concluded that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 created a presumption of
invalidity of FCC rules, thereby imposing on the FCC a greater
burden of justification for keeping the rules in place.117 The FCC
used Fox and Sinclair as primary support for its broad deregulatory
vote on June 2, 2003.118 As the following analysis will show,
however, these opinions were not as opposed to the legitimacy of
broadcast regulation as the FCC later contended.

stations, 64 radio stations, and other assorted businesses), Viacom (owner of
CBS and UPN networks, 39 TV stations, 176 radio stations, cable (MTV), book
publishing and other media businesses), and Time Warner (owner of the WB
network, large holdings in book publishing, cable, movie and TV production and
distribution, music, and internet (AOL) businesses). See Columbia Journalism
Review, “Who Own’s What” at http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/ (last visited
Apr. 1, 2004) (listing major media owners and their holdings).
114
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir.
2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC,
284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The Fox decision discussed infra was actually a
response to five consolidated petitions by national networks. Fox, 280 F.3d at
1033. In addition to Fox Television Stations, Inc., the other four petitioners were
National Broadcasting Company, Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (and parent
company Viacom), and Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P. Id. The
petitioner in Sinclair, while not one of the “Big Five” itself, is a broadcast
network affiliated with a large number of stations owned by the major networks.
See infra note 229 (relating Sinclair’s television holdings).
115
280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
116
284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
117
Fox, 280 F.3d at 1048. The Sinclair opinion, handed down less than two
months later, followed this holding. Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 152.
118
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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1. The Fox decision

In Fox, several major U.S. broadcasters sued the FCC for
failing to revise the NTSO and CBCO rules during its first biennial
review pursuant to section 202(h) of the 1996 Act.119 Fox claimed
that the FCC’s decision not to repeal the rules during its 1998
review was “arbitrary and capricious” and violated Congress’
mandate in section 202(h) of the 1996 Act.120 Fox also contended
that the NTSO rule violated the First Amendment.121
The FCC defended the rules under the 1996 Act as being
necessary in the public interest, dividing its arguments into three
categories: “competition,” “diversity,” and “localism.”122 Fox’s
first argument in response was that, since section 202(h) of the
1996 Act only mentioned “competition,” the FCC was unable to
regulate “in the name of diversity alone.”123 The court disagreed,
holding that “nothing in section 202(h) signals a departure from
[the] historic scope [of diversity in broadcast regulation].”124
Nevertheless, the Chief Judge for the D.C. Circuit, writing for
the majority, agreed with Fox that the decision to maintain the

119

Fox, 280 F.3d at 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2002). More precisely, the petitioners
challenged the FCC rules as a violation of both the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., and The Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Id. at 1033-34. Since the focus of this note is on telecommunications law and
policy under The Telecommunications Act of 1996, discussion of the
administrative law issues posed by the case will not be discussed.
120
Fox, 280 F.3d at 1040, 1049.
121
Id. at 1033.
122
Id. at 1041. This definition of the “public interest” as being composed of
“diversity” and “competition” interests is consistent with the FCC’s 1984 Order.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The Fox court apparently looked at
“localism” justifications as a subset of “diversity.” See id. at 1042 (“In the
context of the regulation of broadcasting, ‘the public interest’ has historically
embraced diversity (as well as localism) . . . .”) (citing FCC v. Nat. Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978)). The remaining discussion of the
Fox and Sinclair cases will use the D.C. Court of Appeals convention of not
distinguishing between diversity and localism interests.
123
Fox, 280 F.3d at 1042.
124
Id.
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rules was unjustified in light of section 202(h).125 Regarding the
NTSO rule, the court found that the FCC had not sufficiently
justified the rule as necessary to further competition.126 The FCC’s
diversity-based justification that the rule was necessary to maintain
the bargaining power of local affiliates with large networks was
also rejected because it did not have “sufficient support in the
present record.”127 Finally, the FCC’s argument that the rule
should be maintained so that the effects of other recent
deregulatory changes could be independently studied was rejected
as being inappropriate in light of the 1996 Act.128 The court held
that the decision to retain the NTSO rule was arbitrary and
capricious.129 Even though the court decided it had the power to
vacate the rule rather than remand, it decided to remand to the FCC
for further consideration.130
Fox’s First Amendment challenge to the NTSO rule was based
primarily on the argument that “in today’s populous media
marketplace the ‘scarcity’ rationale . . . ‘makes no sense’ as a
reason for regulating ownership.”131 This argument was rejected on
the grounds that the Supreme Court’s decisions in NBC and NCCB
were still good law and that, therefore, minimal judicial scrutiny
was the proper standard of review.132 The court found that the
NTSO rule survived minimal scrutiny, reaffirming the
constitutional foundation of the FCC’s traditional commitment to
viewpoint diversity.133
125

Id. at 1045 (holding that “the decision to retain the NTSO Rule was . . .
contrary to § 202(h) of the 1996 Act.”); Id. at 1049 (holding that “the retention
[of the CBCO] was . . . contrary to § 202(h)”).
126
Id. at 1042.
127
Id. at 1043.
128
Id. at 1042. “The Commission’s wait-and-see approach cannot be
squared with its statutory mandate promptly—that is, by revisiting the matter
biennially—to ‘repeal or modify’ any rule that is not ‘necessary in the public
interest.’” Id. (citing § 202(h) of The Telecommunications Act of 1996).
129
Fox, 280 F.3d at 1044.
130
Id. at 1048-49.
131
Id. at 1045.
132
Id. at 1046.
133
Id. at 1047 (holding that “it is not unreasonable—and therefore not
unconstitutional—for the Congress to prefer having in the aggregate more
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Using the same criteria of competition and diversity to evaluate
the FCC’s justifications of the CBCO rule under the 1996 Act, the
court concluded that that rule could not be justified as a result of
either.134 Rather than remanding to the FCC for further
consideration as it had done with the NTSO rule, the court vacated
the CBCO outright.135
The court gave two reasons for the disparate treatment. First,
the court repeatedly referred to the fact that, in 1999, the FCC had
promulgated rules allowing a single entity to own two local
television stations under certain circumstances.136 In support of the
1999 rules, the FCC had concluded that “common ownership of
two broadcast stations in the same local market need not unduly
compromise diversity.”137 The court found that this conclusion
contradicted the FCC’s current argument before the court that the
CBCO was necessary to protect diversity and that, because the
FCC had made “no attempt to harmonize [these] seemingly
inconsistent decisions,” its diversity rationale was “woefully
inadequate.”138 Second, whereas “the intervenors [on behalf of the
FCC had] presented plausible reasons for thinking the NTSO rule
[might] be necessary to further competition,” neither the FCC nor
the intervenors had done so with respect to the CBCO rule.139
The Fox opinion chastised the FCC several times for making
voices heard”). In making this determination, the court acknowledged that
maintaining viewpoint diversity may result in greater inefficiencies in the
television station market. Id. The court nonetheless concluded that “Congress
may, in the regulation of broadcasting, constitutionally pursue values other than
efficiency.” Id.
134
Id. at 1051-52.
135
Fox, 280 F.3d at 1049, 1053. On the one hand, the court found that “the
probability that the Commission will be able to justify retaining the NTSO rule
is sufficiently high that vacatur of the [NTSO] [r]ule is not appropriate.” Id. at
1049. On the other, “[b]ecause the probability that the Commission would be
able to justify retaining the CBCO rule is low and the disruption that vacatur
will create is relatively insubstantial, we shall vacate the CBCO rule.” Id. at
1053.
136
Id. at 1051-52.
137
Id. at 1052.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 1052-53.
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decisions in the absence of a sufficiently fact-laden record.140 The
implicit mandate to the FCC was that, in order to maintain rules in
light of section 202(h), the Commission would have to come up
with some “analytical or empirical” reasons for doing so.141
2. The Sinclair Decision
The second case, Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. FCC,
followed soon after Fox.142 Sinclair, a broadcaster, challenged the
FCC’s Local Ownership Order (LOO), which established certain
conditions precedent before a broadcaster would be allowed to
purchase more than one television station in any local market.143
Sinclair specifically took issue with the FCC requirement that
“eight . . . television stations . . . remain” after the transaction.144
Sinclair alleged that the number eight had been “plucked . . . out of
thin air” and that the inclusion of only broadcast television stations
in the count was inconsistent with another FCC rule dealing with
television-radio cross-ownership.145 That rule, in calculating the
total number of media voices in a local market for purposes of
allowing cross-ownership, included “certain local newspapers and
cable television stations” in the count, while the LOO counted only
broadcast television stations towards the total.146 Sinclair alleged
that these inconsistencies rendered the LOO arbitrary and
capricious.147 Sinclair also challenged the Order on First

140

Id. at 1044 (calling the record “woefully inadequate”); id. at 1044-45
(“The Commission may, of course, change its mind, but it must explain why it is
reasonable to do so.” (citation omitted)).
141
Id. at 1048.
142
Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The
two decisions were handed down less than two months apart. Id.; Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2002), modified by 293
F.3d 537 (2002).
143
See supra note 112 (providing a more detailed description of the LOO).
144
See id.
145
Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 158-59.
146
Id. at 155, 159.
147
Id. at 158.
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Amendment grounds.148
The court explicitly stated that it was reviewing the Local
Ownership Order in light of the Fox holding that “section 202(h)
carries with it a presumption in favor of repealing or modifying the
ownership rules.”149 Finding the inconsistent definitions of media
“voices” the dispositive issue,150 the Sinclair court held that the
Order was arbitrary and capricious and remanded it for further
consideration.151 Aside from this one flaw in the LOO, however,
all of the other arguments Sinclair had made in support of
overturning the Order were resolved in favor of the FCC.152
3. A Possible Retreat?
In a further development, four months after the Fox opinion
was issued, the court modified the opinion after the FCC moved
for a rehearing.153 Following the rehearing, the court agreed to
modify a portion of the opinion that could be read to hold the FCC
to a higher standard of justification for its rules in light of section
202(h).154 The first Fox opinion had stated that “[The
Telecommunications Act of 1996] is clear that a regulation should
be retained only insofar as it is necessary in, not merely consonant
with, the public interest.”155 The court decided to modify its
opinion in order to leave open the question of “what section 202(h)
148

Id. at 152.
Id. (citing Fox, 280 F.3d at 1048).
150
See Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 160 (“But for our conclusion in Part III.C
[discussing the inconsistency between the two rules] the Commission adequately
explained how the local ownership rule furthers diversity at the local level and is
necessary in the ‘public interest’ under § 202(h) of The Telecommunications
Act of 1996.”).
151
Id. at 169.
152
Id. at 162 (passing over the argument against the selection of “eight” as
the proper number of voices); id. at 165 (rejecting all of Sinclair’s arguments
against certain grandfathering provisions of the Order); id. at 167 (rejecting
Sinclair’s First Amendment challenges to the Order).
153
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
154
Id. at 541.
155
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1050 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
149
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means . . . .”156 The court explained its decision not to give section
202(h) a definitive interpretation by noting that such an
interpretation “was unnecessary to the outcome of the case at hand
but might have had ill-considered implications for future cases.”157
This modification of the Fox opinion leaves the “presumption” of
invalidity of FCC rules under section 202(h) in doubt.
B. The Aftermath of Fox and Sinclair: The FCC Responds and
the Mayhem Begins
The FCC responded quickly to the Fox and Sinclair decisions,
indicating that it would consider changes to the remanded rules as
part of its 2002 biennial review.158 In an attempt to generate a more
adequate record from which to make decisions, the FCC held a
number of public events to gather comments.159 To stimulate
public comment, the Commission also released to the public
twelve independent studies it had commissioned on American
media.160
156

Fox, 293 F.3d at 540.
Id. at 540. The second Fox opinion explained that the decision in the
first Fox opinion to remand the NTSO and vacate the CBCO did not turn on
whether § 202(h) imposed upon the FCC the heightened standard of “necessary
in the public interest” or simply the traditional standard of “in the public
interest.” Id. According to the court, “[i]t was clear the Commission failed to
justify the NTSO and the CBCO Rules under either standard.” Id.
158
William LaRue, Owners to Get All Clear From FCC, THE POSTSTANDARD, Apr. 26, 2003, at E1.
159
See Fed. Communications Comm’n, Transcript of Richmond En Banc
Hearing on Broadcast Ownership, February 27, 2003 [hereinafter Richmond
Hearing], at http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/richmond022703.html; Public
Hearing on Media Ownership, Columbia University (excerpts available at
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/documents.html).
160
As the following list shows, the twelve studies, most of which were
released during the fall of 2002, covered a broad range of topics in broadcast
policy: (1) FCCA Comparison of Media Outlets and Owners for Ten Selected
Markets: 1960, 1980, 2000, (2) Viewpoint Diversity in Cross-Owned
Newspapers and Television Stations: A Study of News Coverage of the 2000
Presidential Campaign, (3) Consumer Substitution Among Media, (4)
Consolidation and Advertising Prices in Local Radio Markets, (5) Program
Diversity and the Program Selection Process on Broadcast Network Television,
157
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The FCC voted on the 2002 biennial report on June 2, 2003.161
In a 3-2 vote, the Commission adopted the report, which further
deregulated the broadcast industry by weakening the ownership
rules.162 The vote was split strictly along party lines.163 The major
changes to the television ownership rules included: (1) the
elimination of the two local cross-ownership bans on common
ownership of (a) daily newspapers and broadcast outlets and (b)
radio and television outlets; (2) the revision of the local television
multiple ownership rule, and; (3) the modification of the national
television ownership cap from a 35 percent national audience reach
(6) A Theory of Broadcast Media Concentration and Commercial Advertising,
(7) The Measurement of Local Television News and Public Affairs Programs,
(8) Consumer Survey on Media Usage, (9) Radio Market Structure and Music
Diversity, (10) On the Substitutability of Local Newspaper, Radio, and
Television Advertising in Local Business Sales, (11) Radio Industry Review
2002: Trends in Ownership, Format, and Finance, and (12) Broadcast
Television: Survivor in a Sea of Competition. The studies can be viewed in their
entirety on the FCC’s website. See Media Ownership Working Group Studies, at
http://www.fcc.gov/ ownership/studies.html.
161
The FCC received eight separate letters from Congress requesting that
the vote be delayed. See Fed. Communications Comm’n, Chairman Michael K.
Powell Responds to Members Regarding Upcoming Biennial Review of Media
Ownership, at http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powell/chairmans_ response
(last visited April 1, 2004). One of the letters urged the FCC to “ensure that
Congress and the public have a full opportunity to review and comment on any
specific changes.” Letter to Chairman Powell from Senators Snow, Allard, and
Collins, March 19, 2003, at http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powell/
chairmans_response/Snowe_March19.pdf. In addition, FCC Commissioner
Adelstien warned his colleagues that “the FCC must proceed with caution . . . .
Further media consolidation can’t easily be undone. Once the toothpaste is out
of the tube, it’s going to be difficult, if not impossible to put it back in.”
Richmond Hearing, supra note 135, at 37.
162
Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations
and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local
Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003)
[hereinafter the 2003 Order].
163
Neil Roland, FCC Expected to Loosen Media Ownership Today,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, June 2, 2003, at 63. As expected, the three Republican
commissioners (Abernathy, Martin, and Chairman Powell) voted to relax the
rules. Id. The two Democratic commissioners (Adelstien and Copps) dissented.
Id.
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limit to 45 percent. The Order containing the rule changes also
restated the Commission’s belief that scarcity (and apparently any
regulation justified thereby) was an obsolete concept.164
1.

The New Cross-Ownership Rules

The 2003 Order replaced the newspaper-TV station crossownership ban and radio-TV cross-ownership ban (both of which
prohibited cross-ownership in all local markets nationwide) with a
complex set of cross-media limits based on market size.165 These
limits were calculated using a new metric, called the “Diversity
Index,” designed to “provide [the FCC’s] media ownership
framework with an empirical footing.”166 In the time since the
2003 Order was released, opponents of the new rules, and one
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, have expressed doubt as to
the reliability of the Diversity Index and any cross-media limits
derived therefrom.167
164

See The 2003 Order, supra note 162, ¶ 52. The Order noted that, unlike
the broadcast world in which the scarcity rationale evolved, the modern world is
“characterized not by information scarcity, but by media abundance.” Id.
165
Id. at 46,312-26 ¶ 229-332. After an exhaustive review of the comments
and data, the FCC concluded that neither cross-ownership ban was “necessary in
the public interest.” Id. at 46,312 ¶ 229. Various cross-media limits are
prescribed, with perhaps the most significant change being that in large markets,
defined as those having nine or more TV stations, the FCC imposed no crossmedia restrictions at all. Id. at 46,325 ¶ 327.
166
Id. at 46,316 ¶ 263. The desire to provide a more “empirical” foundation
for the rules seems to be a direct response to the Fox court’s requirement of a
higher standard of rule justification. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying
text. Based on a consumer survey conducted by the FCC in which members of
the public were asked what types of media they used to obtain local news, the
Diversity Index (DI) attempts to give relative “weights” to different types of
media (newspapers, broadcast television, radio, and the Internet) for the
purposes of calculating the level of viewpoint diversity in a given market. Id.
The science behind the DI comes from the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI),
used by anti-trust agencies to calculate the expected loss of competition in an
industry from a proposed merger. Id. ¶ 267.
167
See MARK COOPER, MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND DEMOCRACY IN THE
DIGITAL INFORMATION AGE 191-212 (2003), available at http://cyberlaw.
stanford.edu/blogs/cooper/archives/mediabooke.pdf. Cooper’s major attack on
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2.

The New Local Television Ownership Rule

The FCC also modified the Local Ownership Order at issue in
Sinclair.168 The new rule would allow common ownership of “two
television broadcast stations in markets with 17 or fewer television
stations, and up to three stations in markets with 18 or more
television stations.”169 Responding to the inconsistency pointed out
by the Sinclair court that other FCC rules included non-broadcast
media in the calculation of media voices in a given market, the
FCC fashioned its new local television ownership limits on the
premise that “media other than television broadcast stations
contribute to viewpoint diversity in local markets.”170
3.

The New NTSO Rule

The NTSO rule was relaxed so that a broadcaster could own
stations reaching 45 percent of the national audience.171 This
change was made despite the Fox court’s belief that “the
probability that the Commission will be able to justify retaining the
NTSO Rule is sufficiently high . . . .”172 FCC Chairman Michael

the DI is that, in giving each media type a particular weight in terms of
viewpoint diversity, it ignores the vast disparities in weights among different
firms within each media type. Id. at 194. Cooper points out several odd results
that obtain when the DI is applied to a given market. Id. For example, the DI
concludes that the owner of the Dutchess Community College TV station (a
small local college broadcaster) has more weight than the New York Times. Id.
at 193. Moreover, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals used this same example
during oral argument in a case dealing with the new ownership rules,
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388 (3d Cir. 2003), indicating that
the Court is, in the words of the lead public-interest attorney in that case, “very
concerned that the diversity index is flawed.” See Media Access Project, Report
on Oral Argument in Media Ownership Court Challenge in Prometheus Radio
Project v. FCC (last visited Apr. 1, 2004) at http://www.mediaaccess. org/
MAPOralArg02-12-04.pdf.
168
See The 2003 Order at 46,294 ¶ 81.
169
Id. ¶ 83.
170
See id. ¶ 82.
171
The 2003 Order at 46,328 ¶ 351.
172
Fox, 280 F.3d at 1049.
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K. Powell explained this change in part by recognizing that
national networks needed to own more stations if they were to be
able to satisfy “the public interest benefit of keeping high quality
programming on free over the air TV.”173
After the vote, Chairman Powell attempted to explain his
failure to heed the many calls for more time to consider the
changes.174 He argued that the Fox and Sinclair decisions gave the
FCC no option but to modify the rules175 and that only Congress
had the power to maintain the rules as they were.176
4.

Opposition in Congress and the Courts

Members of Congress, some of them especially upset by the
FCC vote, acted quickly to reverse the rule changes by adding
amendments to the appropriations bill funding the FCC for
2004.177 After the June 2 FCC vote, several networks and publicinterest organizations brought separate challenges to the new rules
in federal court, and these challenges were consolidated before the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.178 On September 3, 2003, the court
granted a stay order that prevented the FCC’s new rules from
173

See Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell, 2002 Biennial
Regulatory Review, at 10, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-03-127A3.doc (released July 2, 2003) [hereinafter Powell
Statement].
174
See id. at 1.
175
Id. On the first page of his statement, Chairman Powell stressed the
“irreducible” point that “[k]eeping the rules exactly as they are, as some so
stridently suggest, was not a viable option. Without today’s surgery, the rules
would assuredly have met a swift death.” Id. In all of his citations to the Fox
decision, Chairman Powell only included the original citation, failing to note the
modification the court later made to some of the more deregulatory-minded
language in the original opinion. Id.
176
Id. “Leaving things unaltered, regardless of changes in the competitive
landscape, is a course that only Congress can legitimately chart.” Id.
177
See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text; see also The Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2004, H.R. 2673, 108th Cong. (2004). Congress was
ultimately successful only in repealing the NTSO and setting a statutory national
cap of 39 percent. Id.
178
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388 (3d Cir. 2003).
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going into effect pending the outcome of the litigation.179 A few
weeks later, the Third Circuit denied the networks’ request to
transfer the venue of their case to the D.C. Circuit, which had
taken a deregulatory position in the Fox and Sinclair decisions.180
Although the networks made a strong case favoring the propriety
of transfer,181 two of the three judges on the panel held that the
June 2 FCC rule changes were not sufficiently close to the Fox and
Sinclair decisions to warrant transfer to the court that had issued
those decisions.182
III. ANALYSIS
The FCC gave both legal and policy justifications for relaxing
media ownership rules on June 2, 2003. The legal justification,
simply put, was that the Fox and Sinclair decisions were a judicial
ultimatum to the FCC that unless the rules were relaxed or
rescinded the Court would itself vacate the rules.183 The policy
justifications centered around two general ideas: first, that the vast
increase in sources of information resulting from the rise in
popularity of cable and the internet rendered fears of oligopolistic
media control baseless,184 and second, that deregulation was
required to maintain high-quality entertainment on free, over-theair television.185
179

Order of September 3, 2003, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 033388 (3d Cir. 2003).
180
Order of September 16, 2003, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No.
03-3388 (3d Cir. 2003).
181
See id. (Scirica, C.J., dissenting).
182
Id. at 4.
183
See Powell Statement, supra note 173, at 1. According to Chairman
Powell’s view, “[w]ithout today’s surgery, the rules would assuredly have met a
swift death.” Id.
184
See The 2003 Order, supra note 3, ¶ 52 (finding that, unlike the
broadcast marketplace in the past, today’s communications market is
“characterized not by information scarcity, but by media abundance”).
185
See The 2003 Order, supra note 3, at 46,329 ¶ 352 (raising the NTSO
cap from 35 percent to 45 percent on the grounds that allowing broadcasters to
reach larger audiences “will help networks compete more effectively with cable
and [satellite] operators and will promote free, over-the-air television by
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The legal justifications given by the FCC for their decision to
deregulate broadcast media ownership on June 2 were unsound and
reflect an inappropriately broad interpretation of the Fox and
Sinclair decisions. As such, the FCC’s decision to deregulate must
be judged primarily on the Commission’s policy choices. These
choices fundamentally misjudge the implications of the changing
media landscape and seriously miss the appropriate balance
between the value of popular television entertainment and the
maintenance of a wide diversity of viewpoints in public discourse.
The June 2 rule changes risk serious harm to the public interest that
the FCC is mandated to pursue in its exercise of rulemaking
authority under both the Communications Act of 1934 and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Specifically, it is likely that
viewpoint diversity will suffer if the new rules deregulating
broadcast ownership are allowed to take effect. Therefore, since
the FCC did in fact have more authority to shape its rules than it
chose to exercise, the Commission should assume responsibility
for the folly of its decision.
A. Did the D.C. Court of Appeals Go Too Far?
One possible explanation of Congress’ adverse reaction to the
FCC’s June 2 vote is that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
misread congressional intent when it interpreted the 1996 Act to
create a presumption of invalidity of FCC rules. The FCC based its
decision to deregulate to a large extent on this judicial gloss on the
1996 Act.186 Perhaps the Congressional backlash to the FCC’s
decision is an expression that the court got it wrong.
On its face, section 202(h) merely requires the FCC to reevaluate the rules every two years and modify or repeal those rules
it determines are no longer in the public interest.187 For the Fox
deterring migration of expensive programming to cable networks”).
186
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
187
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 §202(h). “The Commission shall
review . . . all of its ownership rules biennially . . . and shall determine whether
any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.
The Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no
longer in the public interest.” Id. The Fox opinion’s interpretation of § 202(h) in
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court to derive a presumption of invalidity from this review
requirement, it could have analyzed the Congressional record
surrounding the 1996 Act; however, in the Fox opinion there is a
conspicuous lack of consideration of the legislative history relating
to section 202(h).188 The court merely reiterated several
deregulatory provisions of the 1996 Act189 and, without more,
imputed to section 202(h) a “presumption in favor of repealing or
modifying the ownership rules.”190
There is evidence that motives other than deregulation for the
public interest were behind section 202(h). For example, large
corporate broadcasters, preferring deregulation for economic
reasons, lobbied heavily to obtain favorable legislation.191 In
some respects gives the FCC more discretion to maintain its rules than is
apparent on the face of the statute. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280
F.3d 1027, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Whereas § 202(h) only mentions
“competition” as a basis for determining whether a rule is “necessary in the
public interest,” the Fox court held that “[i]n the context of the regulation of
broadcasting, the public interest has historically embraced diversity (as well as
localism), and nothing in section 202(h) signals a departure from that historic
scope.” Fox, 280 F.3d at 1042.
188
The Fox court did refer to the Congressional Record relevant to The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 at one point in its opinion, but it was to refute
the FCC’s argument that the NTSO’s 35 percent limit should be maintained in
deference to the comments of the ranking member of the relevant House
subcommittee. The court concluded that “[t]his legislative history is no basis
whatever for the [FCC’s] decision.” Fox, 280 F.3d at 1043.
189
See Fox, 280 F.3d at 1033.
190
Id. at 1048.
191
See Bethany M. Burns, Reforming the Newspaper Industry: Achieving
First Amendment Goals of Diversity Through Structural Regulation, 5 COMM.
LAW CONSPECTUS 61, 68 n.91 (1997) (discussing strong lobbying by large
media corporations during deliberations on The Telecommunications Act of
1996); John McCain, Telecom Ownership Needs To Be Diversified, THE HILL,
October 20, 1999, at 23. McCain, Republican Senator from Arizona, called the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 a “lemon,” pointing out that during
negotiations over the Act, “special interests had a seat at the table, but
consumers, in whose name the bill was advanced, did not.” Id. Such lobbying
efforts by Big Media have historically pervaded broadcast regulation. See
ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935
passim (1993).
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addition, Professor Thomas Krattenmaker, a telecommunications
law authority of some note,192 made statements at one of the FCC’s
public hearings that raise the possibility that another powerful
interest group, the Telecommunications Bar, had an independent,
vested interest in the biennial review provisions of the 1996 Act.193
B. The Fox and Sinclair Decisions Did Not Leave the FCC
With No Other Choice
The Fox and Sinclair courts certainly contain language
interpreting section 202(h) as charting a hasty deregulatory course
for broadcast ownership.194 The FCC’s June 2 vote, however, went
significantly beyond Fox and Sinclair. Not only did the 2003 Order
modify rules that were not before the court in those cases, but the
FCC’s reliance on those cases to relax the rules at issue in Fox and
192

Mr. Krattenmaker, who once clerked on the Supreme Court for Justice
Harlan, has had a long career in telecommunications law and policy spanning
government work, private practice, and academia. See Richmond Hearing, supra
note 159, at 37.
193
Professor Krattenmaker, who moderated a public FCC media ownership
hearing in Richmond, Virginia in February, 2003, noted the vast pecuniary gain
the Telecommunications Bar would reap from § 202(h) of the 1996 Act. See
Richmond Hearing, supra note 159, at 43-44. Discussing the biennial review
process, and the work created for lawyers by each review, Krattenmaker stated,
“[t]alk about the communication lawyers perpetual guaranteed income act. I join
with all other members of the Federal Communications Bar Association in
expressing our undying gratitude to Congress for having dug this very deep
trough at which we may feed for years on end” Id. There is precedent for the
ability of organized industry lawyers’ associations to mold legislation to help
their legal practices. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA, 44-46 (discussing the influence of the
nascent bankruptcy bar on federal bankruptcy legislation in the early twentieth
century); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1939-40 (1998) (citing several
sources for the proposition that the influence of the corporate bar “has made
Delaware law indeterminate and litigation-oriented in order to generate demand
for legal services”).
194
See Fox, 280 F.3d at 1044. “[T]he mandate of § 202(h) might better be
likened to Farragut’s order at the battle of Mobile Bay (‘Damn the torpedoes!
Full speed ahead.’) than to the wait-and-see attitude of the Commission.” Id.
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Sinclair ignored several portions of those opinions that left the
FCC the option to both keep the rules and satisfy the Fox court’s
requirement of more “analytical or empirical” evidence to keep
them.195 The June 2 vote relaxed both the newspaper-TV and
radio-TV cross ownership bans, yet neither of these rules was at
issue in Fox and Sinclair.196 Of the three rules considered in the
Fox and Sinclair cases, only one, the CBCO, was vacated; the
other two were simply remanded for further consideration.197
Moreover, the Local Ownership Order at issue in Sinclair was
remanded on narrow grounds; all but one of the arguments against
that rule were resolved in favor of maintaining it.198 These facts
seem to belie Chairman Powell’s assertions that the rules as
previously written would “assuredly have met a swift death” in the
courts.199
Contrary to Chairman Powell’s reading of Fox and Sinclair to
create a vice-like grip on the FCC’s rulemaking discretion, a more
realistic interpretation of those opinions might have led the
Commission merely to conclude that section 202(h) of the 1996
Act raised the standard of FCC justification and that a better
factual predicate for retention of the rules would be required. The
two dissenting members of the FCC adopted this view in their
statements accompanying the vote.200 Commissioner Copps read
the Fox and Sinclair opinions to require better justifications, not
195

Id. at 1048.
See The 2003 Order, supra note 3, at 46,312-26 ¶ 229-332.
197
See supra notes 130 (remanding the NTSO), 135 (vacating the CBCO),
151 (remanding the LOO) and accompanying text.
198
See supra note 152 and accompanying text. As discussed supra, the
LOO was remanded to the FCC on the sole ground that an earlier FCC rule
defined the term “media voices” more broadly than did the LOO. Id. In
repealing the LOO, the FCC never considered the possibility of modifying the
earlier rule’s definition of “voices” to be consistent with the LOO, an option that
would have equally answered the Sinclair court’s objection to that rule.
199
See Powell Statement, supra note 173, at 1.
200
See Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Dissenting, at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-127A5.doc
[hereinafter Copps statement]; Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S.
Adelstien, Dissenting, at 3, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-03-127A7.doc [hereinafter Adelstien statement].
196
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outright deregulation.201 Copps believed that the factual record
amassed by the FCC adequately justified maintaining the rules
under the two decisions.202 Commissioner Adelstien echoed these
sentiments in his statement.203 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted this more reasonable interpretation of the Fox and Sinclair
opinions as well.204
Moreover, to the extent the FCC’s decision was based on a
view that the scarcity doctrine no longer justifies ownership
regulations, the Fox and Sinclair decisions certainly did not
remove any of the long-standing authority of the FCC to
promulgate rules in the public interest. To do so would have been
to ignore the consistent holdings of the Supreme Court in NBC and
its progeny that the FCC has broad authority to promulgate rules in
the exercise of its special expertise on the public interest as it
applies to broadcasting.205 As both the Fox and Sinclair opinions
recognized, the Supreme Court has never indicated that the FCC’s
authority in this realm has diminished, despite the many calls from
Big Media that technological advances have rendered the scarcity
doctrine obsolete.206
201

See Copps statement, supra note 200, at 8. “[Under Fox and Sinclair]
we are obligated to present reasoned rationales with more compelling
explanations than we have thus far presented. But we are not instructed to
radically restructure the rules.” (emphasis in original). Id.
202
Id. “The evidence we have amassed points to the need for maintaining
existing media concentration protections.” Id.
203
See Adelstien statement, supra note 200, at 3. “The Fox and Sinclair
courts sent the rules back to us for justification, not for evisceration.” Id.
204
Order of September 16, 2003, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No.
03-3388 at 4-5 (3d Cir. 2003). “The D.C. Circuit Court simply instructed the
FCC to justify its rules on media ownership with an eye to the public interest.”
Id.
205
See supra notes 60, 63 and accompanying text.
206
See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1046 (D.C.
Cir. 2002), modified by 293 F.3d 537 (2002). The court rejected Fox’s First
Amendment argument that the scarcity doctrine should no longer apply because
of new technologies, holding that “[t]he Supreme Court has already heard the
empirical case against [the scarcity] rationale and still ‘declined to question its
continuing validity.’” Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 638 (1994)); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 169 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (rejecting Sinclair’s argument that the scarcity doctrine should no
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Finally, even assuming that Chairman Powell’s reading of Fox
and Sinclair is tenable, his belief that maintaining the rules was not
an option after those decisions assumes that every possible
reviewing court would agree with the opinion of the D.C. Court of
Appeals. But the Third Circuit made it clear, in refusing to transfer
the venue of the challenges to the FCC’s rule changes, that the
D.C. Circuit did not have exclusive jurisdiction over such
challenges.207
C. Sinclair on the Diversity Prong of The Public Interest
In addition to those aspects of the Fox and Sinclair opinions
suggesting that those opinions did not significantly constrain the
FCC’s rulemaking authority, one other idea discussed in Sinclair
concerning diversity and its relationship to the public interest
merits attention.208 It will, however, be helpful to briefly review
the place of diversity in the hierarchy of traditional notions of the
longer apply on the grounds that “‘nothing in the subsequent decisions of the
[Supreme] Court has called the constitutional validity of the [NCCB] doctrine
into question.’” (quoting Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
Other sections of the Fox and Sinclair opinions do not take as deferential a
stance to Supreme Court precedent. To the extent that Fox and Sinclair require
the FCC to provide more of an empirical or analytical justification of their rules,
they are ignoring the Supreme Court’s observation in NCCB that “[d]iversity
and its effects are . . . elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone
measured . . . .” FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796-97
(1978). As is characteristic of many public goods, the public benefits derived
from diverse ownership of the tools of mass communication simply cannot be
measured to the same degree of accuracy as can the economic benefits of
consolidation. If Fox and Sinclair indeed require this degree of accuracy, the
D.C. Court of Appeals is simply asking the impossible. Such a requirement
would be tantamount to judicial appropriation of power traditionally held by the
FCC.
207
Order of September 16, 2003, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No.
03-3388 at 5 (3d Cir. 2003). “[I]f Congress had meant to give the D.C. Circuit
Court exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals, it would have explicitly done
so . . . .” Id. The Third Circuit also pointed out that, even if the D.C. Circuit
Court were to assume jurisdiction over the current case, a different panel of
judges than those who issued the Fox and Sinclair decisions would hear it. Id.
208
Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 161.
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public interest.
Debates over the meaning of the public interest have always
swirled around two main concepts: competition (the undue
concentration of economic power) and diversity.209 This note
contends that the public interest in the broadcasting context cannot
be adequately protected by rules based on competition (i.e.
antitrust) grounds alone. Rather, to protect viewpoint diversity, a
greater degree of regulation is required than merely that amount
necessary to ensure against undue concentrations of economic
power.210 The following analysis of a portion of the Sinclair
opinion discussing diversity highlights the need for greater
209

See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing competition and
diversity in broadcast regulation). The FCC has traditionally viewed “diversity”
as being comprised of four distinct categories. See In the matter of 2002
Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 17 F.C.C. Rcd 18503, 18516 (2002). These
four categories are (1) viewpoint diversity, (2) outlet diversity, (3) source
diversity, and (4) program diversity. Viewpoint diversity “ensures that the public
has access to a wide range of diverse and antagonistic opinions and
interpretations,” and “has been the touchstone of the Commission’s ownership
rules and policies.” Id. Outlet diversity is “the control of media outlets by a
variety of independent owners.” Id. Source diversity “ensures that the public has
access to information and programming from multiple content providers” Id.
Program diversity refers to “a variety of programming formats and content” Id.
210
See Brenner, supra note 49, at 1018-19. Brenner refers to this added
degree of scrutiny specific to media mergers as “antitrust-plus.” Id. Robert
Pitofsky, a former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, articulated the
rationale for antitrust-plus scrutiny in broadcasting. Testifying before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights, he said,
“Concern about concentrated economic power should be given added weight
where the merger (or a wave of mergers) concerns companies involved in the
communication of ideas. In those industries, there is more at stake than high
prices or low quality to consumers - there is a more fundamental issue of
avoiding centralized control over access to the marketplace of ideas.” Id. at n.64.
In the 2003 Order, the FCC partially accepted this view that economic-based
regulations would not in all cases protect viewpoint diversity. See the 2003
Order, supra note 3, at 46,289 ¶ 35 (noting that “our analysis of the record leads
us to conclude that preserving competitive markets will not, in all cases,
adequately protect viewpoint diversity.”). The FCC, however, incorrectly
limited this conclusion to “smaller markets.” Id.
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government regulation to protect this interest.211
The “public convenience interest, convenience, and necessity”
has traditionally been a catch-all phrase that has been used to
validate a wide range of regulatory philosophies.212 During the first
fifty years of broadcast regulation, the FRC and, later, the FCC
determined that satisfying the public interest required both
behavioral and structural regulation.213 From the late 1970s until
the present, changing notions of the public interest have led to a
virtual abandonment of behavioral regulations and have left a mix
of market control and an increasingly impotent regime of structural
regulations.214 This progressive deregulation of broadcasting is the
product of a laissez-faire perspective that the market is a better
provider for the public interest in most cases than a rule regime
maintained by government.215 Because the public interest clearly
211

This statement assumes that “competition” as applied to public interest
analysis means solely economic competition - the Fox and Sinclair decisions
made this assumption. See Fox, 280 F.3d at 1041 (equating “competition”
concerns with concerns of “undue market power”); Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 160
(referring to the FCC’s justifications on grounds of “economic competition”). A
non-economic conception of competition, that is, fair competition in the
“marketplace of ideas,” is roughly equivalent to the concept of viewpoint
diversity. See Bruce M. Owen, Regulatory Reform: The Telecommunications Act
of 1996 and the FCC Media Ownership Rules, 2003 DET. C.L. REV. 671 (2003)
(equating “the FCC’s traditional concern with competition in the marketplace of
ideas and information” with “diversity”). The remainder of this note will use the
term “competition” to refer to solely economic competition, while the term
“viewpoint diversity” will encompass any form of non-economic competition.
Suffice it to say that this author believes that a lack of clarity and common
understanding in the use of such terms as “competition” and “diversity” is a
major factor in the obscurity of the underlying interests involved.
212
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the broad “public
interest” standard). An early commentator may have been exercising a great deal
of precognition when he stated, “[the public interest means] about as little as any
phrase that the drafters of the [Radio] Act could have used and still comply with
the constitutional requirement that there be some standard to guide the
administrative wisdom of the licensing authority.” Fowler, supra note 78, at
214-215 (quoting Louis Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience,
or Necessity as Used in The Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930)).
213
See supra Part I.C-D.
214
See supra Part I.E-F.
215
See, e.g., Brenner & Fowler, supra note 93, at 210.
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means different things to different people, however, a discussion
on the merits of these competing philosophies is meaningless
unless a more precise definition (or definitions) of the public
interest is identified.216
The Sinclair opinion recognized this confusion and, in bringing
it to light, suggested a course by which the FCC could have
adequately justified the remanded rules. The court pointed out a
miscommunication between the parties concerning their respective
definitions of “diversity.” The court noted that the FCC’s
arguments in support of the Local Ownership Order focused
largely on “viewpoint diversity,” defined as “station owners
bringing unique points of view to the selection of material they
air.”217 The networks, on the other hand, argued against the rule on
grounds of “programming diversity,” which the court defined as
“the number of different types of programs on the air, regardless of
whether they reflect differing editorial viewpoints.”218 This
distinction complicated the debate over the Local Ownership Order
because the broadcasters argued that the rule was irrational as a
means to promote “programming diversity,” while the FCC
defended the rule as a rational means to protect “viewpoint
diversity.”219 In highlighting the different definitions of “diversity”
utilized by the parties, the Sinclair opinion also stated that
broadcaster Sinclair’s arguments “overstate[d] the burden” on the
FCC to justify the rule.220 The court recognized that it could not
require the FCC to predict harms to viewpoint diversity with
greater particularity or precision without being unfaithful to current
Supreme Court scarcity doctrine.221 Dissenting in the Sinclair
court’s judgment, Judge Sentelle reiterated the conflicting
216

Compare id. (advocating a market-controlled broadcast policy because
“[t]he public’s interest, then, defines the public interest”) with Cass R. Sunstien,
Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 501 (1999) (“There is
a large difference between the public interest and what interests the public.”).
217
Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 161 (emphasis added).
218
Id. (emphasis added).
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 161 (rejecting broadcaster’s argument that changes in the media
market place a higher burden of justification on the FCC).
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definitions of diversity relied upon by the parties and suggested
that, in order to maintain the rule, “the Commission should define
its diversity goal, and in doing so explain the distinctions (and
interaction) between programming diversity and viewpoint
diversity, rather than simply quoting boilerplate on the
‘elusiveness’ of diversity.”222
These discussions further suggest that, had a majority of the
FCC been so inclined, the Commission could have adequately
justified the NTSO rule and the Local Ownership Order following
remand by the Fox and Sinclair courts, not to mention those rules
which were not before the court in those cases, by emphasizing the
primary importance of viewpoint diversity and stressing the need
for strong ownership rules to preserve viewpoint diversity and the
benefits it bestows upon public discourse in our nation.
D. Further Media Ownership Deregulation Is Dangerous and
Unwise Policy
The foregoing arguments reveal the shaky foundation on which
the FCC based its legal justification for the requirement of further
media deregulation. The FCC continues to hold broad powers to
promulgate broadcast ownership rules in the public interest. As
such, the FCC’s decision to relax its rules on June 2, 2003 was not
a product of external judicial coercion, but rather a discretionary
choice not to exercise such power.
That is not to say the FCC’s decision was illegitimate; just
because the FCC once thought rules were necessary in the public
interest does not prevent it from eventually changing its mind.223 In
this case, however, the voluntary decision by the FCC to
deregulate dangerously fails to provide for the public interest,
particularly the public’s interest in viewpoint diversity. Even if
greater concentration of broadcast ownership is, as the FCC
maintains, required to maintain the “high” quality of current over222

Sinclair, 284 F.3d 148, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
See Pinellas Broad. Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
“[A] Commission’s view of what is best in the public interest may change from
time to time. Commissions themselves change, underlying philosophies differ,
and experience often dictates changes.” Id.
223
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the-air broadcasting,224 arguments to that effect fail to give due
weight to the potential effects of further deregulation on viewpoint
diversity. There may indeed be some public benefits gained from
allowing media corporations to own more television stations.225
These potential benefits, however, do not justify the risks involved
and, in any event, sufficient safeguards are not in place to
effectively guard against the public harms consolidation is likely to
cause. The fact that these harms are difficult to measure makes
them no less dangerous.226 Indeed, it may make them more so.
1. The New Rules Will Lead to Further Consolidation of
Broadcast Ownership
There is strong evidence that the new rules adopted by the FCC
on June 2, which raise the number of television stations a single
company can own locally and completely eliminate the
corresponding national cap, will lead to further consolidation of
broadcasting power in the hands of fewer owners. First,
deregulation in other industries often has the effect of
consolidation.227 Second, media commentators have historically
224

Reference to the current state of broadcast television quality as “high”
reflects the operating ideology of the FCC and the networks (and some viewers,
no doubt), and in no way reflects the personal opinion of the author.
225
See Brenner, supra note 49, at 1026-27. Brenner gives some examples
of benefits he thinks might flow from allowing media companies to grow larger,
including the ability to: (1) “finance start-up content activity that smaller entities
cannot afford”; (2) “combat government censorship and support First
Amendment freedoms,” and; (3) “expand speech diversity” by expanding into
niche markets. Id.
226
See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796-97
(1978) (“Diversity and its effects are . . . elusive concepts, not easily defined let
alone measured. . . .”). It is not hard to understand why it is difficult to measure
and report a lack of viewpoint diversity in broadcasting. In addition to all the
common problems generally involved in proving a negative, in this instance one
so inclined has the added burdens of identifying voices that are not being heard
and then making the result of this effort itself heard above the din of commercial
media.
227
See Alison Harcourt, The European Commission and Regulation of the
Media Industry, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 425, 429-30 (1998) (discussing
media deregulation causing ownership consolidation in the European Union);
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noted that in the search for larger audiences, media companies
naturally expand.228 Third, the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
which called for an immediate and severe deregulation of the radio
industry, resulted in an “orgy of consolidation” in the three years
following enactment.229 Less quantitative, but perhaps equally
probative, is the fact that the majority of the petitioners in the
lawsuits challenging the FCC regulations under the 1996 Act are
large corporations already possessing a significant number of
stations and seeking to possess even more.230
Richard D. Cudahy, The FERC’s Policy on Electric Mergers: A Bit of
Perspective, 18 ENERGY L. J. 113 (1997) (in energy provider markets); PAUL S.
DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 146-49
(1987) (in the airline industry).
228
See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS
COMMUNICATIONS Vol. II 617 (1947) (concluding that, due to economic
pressures to expand, “bigness in the press is here to stay, whether we like it or
not”). Chafee’s arguments were directed at the radio industry—then the
dominant form of broadcasting. They apply with equal force, however, to
television today.
229
Baker, supra note 53, at 868 (citing Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. &
Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power, Democracy, and
the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 815 n.7 (2000)). Baker
gives as an example the statistic that “at the time of The Telecommunications
Act of 1996, the largest radio ownership group consisted of less than forty
stations. By September 2000, a single owner held over 1,000 of the country’s
12,600 stations.” Id. at n.154 (citations omitted); see also George Williams &
Scott Roberts, Radio Industry Review 2002: Trends in Ownership, Format, and
Finance (2002) at 3, at hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC226838A20.doc. This FCC-sponsored study found that, between March 1996
and March 2002, there was an increase in the number of commercial radio
stations of 5.4 percent. Id. During the same period, the number of radio owners
declined by 34 percent. Id.
230
For example, a brief search on an internet financial information database
reveals the vast holdings of the two main petitioners in the Fox and Sinclair
cases. “Fox Television Stations owns and operates 35 full-power stations located
in nine designated market areas. Fox has 188 affiliated stations, including 25
full-power television stations that are owned by subsidiaries of the Company.”
Yahoo! Finance, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=FOX (last visited
April 1, 2004); “Sinclair’s television group includes 20 FOX, 19 WB, 6 UPN, 8
ABC, 3 CBS, 4 NBC affiliates and 2 independent stations and reaches
approximately 24% of all U.S. television households.” Sinclair homepage,
available at http://www.sbgi. net/business/television.shtml (last visited April 1,

KELLERMACRO.DOC

4/23/2004 1:20 PM

FCC DEREGULATION OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP

937

This is not to say that the FCC’s deregulatory mission should
be halted just because it will result in consolidation. Indeed, the
FCC emphatically pointed to certain results from its research that
indicated that more consolidation might actually benefit the public
interest.231 Other commentators have also suggested that certain
facets of the public interest, such as program diversity, are
enhanced by allowing large media corporations to amass greater
broadcasting capability.232
These possible benefits, however, must be weighed against the
risks deregulation poses to viewpoint diversity. Commentators
have pointed to several potential harms media consolidation may
engender.233 In one way or another, all of the foregoing risks flow
from decreased viewpoint diversity, regardless of whether the
2004).
231

See Powell statement, supra note 173, at 9 (“We found the national cap
restrains the networks from serving additional communities with more local
news and public affairs programming.”); Editorial, The ‘Friends’ Factor at the
FCC, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 18, 2003, at 25 (paraphrasing FCC
chairman Michael Powell’s warning that, unless the national ownership cap was
lifted, big networks like NBC might not be able to continue to afford the high
production costs of sit-coms like Friends and other shows of “that quality”). Id
232
See Brenner, supra note 49, at 1026-27 (giving several examples of
increased “diversity” that may occur if companies are allowed to grow larger).
233
The thesis of this note is that viewpoint diversity should be an
overriding interest in broadcast regulation regardless of the benefits media
consolidation may bring. Therefore, detailed criticism of the merits of
deregulation offered by its proponents is beyond the scope of this note. Briefly,
however, the following arguments might be made: (1) The FCC concluded that
the NTSO cap should be raised because commonly-programmed (i.e. networkaffiliated) stations actually produce more local news programming than
independent stations. See the 2003 Order, supra note 3, at 46,339 ¶ 425. More
local news, however, does not necessarily mean better local news, especially if
the increased “local” news is dictated by management far away, thus removing
the true “local” nature of the viewpoints presented; (2) As to the list of benefits
proffered by Brenner (supra note 225), he mentions the increased ability large
corporations have to “combat government censorship and support First
Amendment freedoms.” Brenner, supra note 49, at 1026-27. This benefit might
shine less brightly when held next to the potential glare of corporate censorship;
(3) As for Chairman Powell’s threats that the failure to allow consolidation
might result in a loss of popular free, over-the-air situation comedy, the risks of
popular revolution if Friends goes off the air are left to the reader to calculate.
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viewpoints are presented as news, editorial, or entertainment
programs.
There are several problems associated with concentrated
corporate control of news production.234 First, concentration of
media power poses a risk of deterioration of the overall quality of
news coverage.235 Second, consolidation risks the important role a
private media plays as a “watchdog” of government.236 Third, a
system of few owners of media outlets makes it easier for the
powerful to influence them all.237 Fourth, to the extent that large
media corporations have non-media property interests, vesting
them with greatly disproportionate media control “creates
opportunities and incentives to mold content to serve the firm’s
overall corporate interests.”238 Finally, evidence from the
deregulation of radio in the 1990s suggests that further
consolidation in television may also result in decreased program
originality in favor of profit-maximizing programming
234

Some of the factors militating against consolidation discussed herein are
treated more comprehensively in Baker, supra note 53, 902-13.
235
See Richmond Hearing, supra note 159, at 21 (citing evidence that past
consolidation has led to “far less coverage of news and public interest
programming”). Some have argued that news provided by large for-profit
ventures has already become so dominant in society that it is mistakenly
perceived today to be “objective.” Brenner, supra note 49, at 1029 n.119 (citing
BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 216-18 (4th ed. 1992)).
236
Baker, supra note 53, at 906 n.275 (discussing the benefits of dispersed
media power in regard to the “Fourth Estate” function of the press). For a
general discussion of this “watchdog” role of a free press, see Justice Potter
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631, 634 (1975).
237
Baker, supra note 53, at 907 (“Control or corruption is likely to be
easier the fewer media entities [those with political or economic power] need to
control.”). Baker also discusses the risks of external media co-option when large
media conglomerates also have significant non-media holdings. Id. at 908.
Powerful outside groups, both governmental and private, may then exert
economic pressure on these non-media businesses in order to control editorial
decisions in the broadcast divisions. Id. (giving several historical examples of
such coercion).
238
See Baker, supra note 53, at 909 (discussing reports that Ruport
Murdoch promised then-president Jimmy Carter the support of Murdoch’s New
York Post in exchange for favorable licensing decisions for an airline Murdoch
was trying to start).
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strategies.239
In addition to these specific risks, it is simply a legitimate goal
in a democratic society to disperse “the organs of public opinion
formation” in a way that gives all groups a “real” share of
communicative power.240 It was these concerns that motivated the
FCC in years past to impose strong national ownership
restrictions.241 These “organs of public opinion formation” are not
limited to news and editorial programs. Some commentators have
argued that even programs commonly viewed as entertainment
carry a social message important to public debate.242 What
239

See Richmond Hearing, supra note 159, at 21 (citing a multi-year study
by a group called the Future of Music Coalition which found a “homogenization
of music that gets air play” and concluded that “radio seems to serve now more
to advertise the products of vertically integrated conglomerates than to entertain
Americans with the best and most original programming”).
240
Baker, supra note 53, at 905-06 (“Dispersal of media power, like
dispersal of voting power, is simply a key attribute of a system considered to be
democratic.”). Id.
241
See id. at 906; see also Fox, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034) (stating purpose of
NTSO rule as being “to promote diversification of ownership in order to
maximize diversification of program and service viewpoints” and “to prevent
any undue concentration of economic power”).
242
See Fiss, supra note 16, at 1411 (1986). “The viewpoint of an
organization such as CBS . . . is not confined to the announced ‘Editorial
Message,’ but extends to the broadcast of Love Boat as well. In the ordinary
show or commercial a view of the world is projected, which in turn tends to
define and order our options and choices.” Id. This view is echoed by Mark
Cooper, the Director of Research for the Consumer Federation of America.
Cooper relates an interview with FCC Chairman Powell in which Powell
derided the view that entertainment could have a political component. See
COOPER, supra note 4, at 17. In that interview Chairman Powell stated that “the
overwhelming amount of programming we watch is entertainment, and I don’t
know what it means for the owner to have a political bias. When I’m watching
Temptation Island, do I see little hallmarks of Rupert Murdoch?” COOPER, supra
note 4, at 17 (citing Davidson, Paul, FCC Could Alter Rules Affecting TV,
Telephone, Airwaves, USA Today, February 6, 2002). In response, Cooper notes
that “[t]he decision of what is entertaining and what values are promoted in
society is clearly embodied in the commercial decision underlying “Temptation
Island.” It stands for the proposition that paying people money to put their
relationships in jeopardy under a voyeuristic lens constitutes good
programming.” COOPER, supra note 4, at 17.
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broadcast deregulation offers is the concentration of this power to
convey ideas and opinions, to “select, to edit, and to choose the
methods, manner and emphasis of presentation,” into a smaller
group of large media conglomerates.243 The FCC’s decision to
deregulate, therefore, indirectly places a large portion of the public
marketplace of ideas into the hands of corporate entities whose
primary interest in providing profitable popular entertainment is far
removed from those interests identified by the Supreme Court as
important to a democratic society.244 Under their control, a
narrowing range of public discourse is likely to result.245 John
Stuart Mill, discussing the importance of debate in a free society,
noted:
Unless opinions favorable to democracy and to aristocracy,
to property and to equality, to co-operation and to
competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and
individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other
standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with
equal freedom and enforced and defended with equal talent
and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining
their due; one scale is sure to go up, and the other down.246
243

FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 785 (1978)
(listing some of the powers attendant upon ownership of television stations).
244
See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (citing relevant Supreme
Court cases).
245
COOPER, supra note 4, at 21. Cooper discusses the ability of the free
market to provide popular entertainment relative to its ability to provide
viewpoint diversity. Id. While the marketplace is “splendid” for providing goods
and services such as entertainment, it fails to produce “the kind of debate that
constantly renews the capacity of a people for self-determination.” Id. (citing
Owen M. Fiss, Essays Commemorating the One Hundredth Anniversary of the
Harvard Law Review: Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987)). The
FCC’s current position elevates the kind of entertainment provided under a
marketplace model of regulation over the “[u]nique perspectives provided by
different institutions.” Id. at 20. It caters to the public’s demand for
entertainment rather than “the net increase in consumer welfare from having
many competing news sources and editorial voices.” Id. (citing Maurice E.
Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 249 n.140 (2001)).
246
See Mill, supra note 1, at 45-46.
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It would be absurd to suggest either that contemporary views
on these “standing antagonisms of practical life” are not formed, at
least in part, by what we watch on television or that the views of
the broadcasters who decide what we see (and what we do not) on
television are not a factor which bears upon what they choose to
broadcast.247 These two realities alone advise an extraordinary
degree of caution in governmental decisions on which institutions
should hold the power of the mass media.248
Finally, the FCC’s assurances that these threats to viewpoint
diversity are irrational because of the “abundance” of voices
populating today’s media marketplace are misleading.249
Dissenting from the June 2 vote, FCC Commissioner Copps
pointed out that an increase in the raw number of channels does not
serve the end of viewpoint diversity if the most widely-used of
these new channels are owned and programmed by the same
handful of owners who currently dominate broadcasting.250
247

See COOPER, supra note 4, at 17-18 (citing examples of broadcaster
exclusion of certain disfavored political viewpoints from their broadcasts).
248
See the 2003 Order, supra note 3, at 46,319 ¶ 281. This point takes its
significance from the fact that television is the primary source by which most
Americans obtain their news on current issues. Id. Viewpoint diversity would be
much easier to come by if diverse speakers had equal access to the public’s
attention. See also Fiss, supra note 16, at 1410-1413 (discussing the differences
between the modern, mass-media-dominated marketplace of ideas, and that of
the past, where virtually every speaker could gain access to a public forum).
249
The FCC used the argument that increasing broadcast capacity renders
the scarcity doctrine obsolete both to repudiate the fairness doctrine in 1985, see
supra note 99, and to justify the June 2 deregulation, see supra note 164. The
Supreme Court, however, has yet to repudiate the doctrine. See supra note 206.
250
See Copps statement, supra note 200, at 3. Commenting on the
majority’s argument that the scarcity rationale was rendered obsolete by the
arrival of cable and the internet, Copps stated:
What about the vaunted 500-channel universe of cable TV saving us?
Well, 90 percent of the top cable channels are owned by the same
giants that own the TV networks and the cable systems. More channels
are great. But when they’re all owned by the same people, cable
doesn’t protect localism, editorial diversity, or competition. And those
who believe the Internet alone will save us from this fate should realize
that the dominating Internet news sources are controlled by the same
media giants who control radio, TV, newspapers, and cable. So, how
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2. There Has Not Been Sufficient Preparation for Dealing with the
Risks Involved
The foregoing arguments show that there are both benefits to
be realized and potential dangers to be avoided in a deregulated
media industry. Even if the FCC’s elevation of entertainment over
diversity did not misjudge the hierarchy of interests appropriate in
a democracy, it would be foolish policy to plunge into deregulation
without establishing at least minimal safeguards of viewpoint
diversity. Several of the dangers mentioned above relate to
possible deleterious effects of consolidation on the role of the
media in investigative journalism.251 A large media company with
an investigative reporting division relatively free from corporate
control may pose less of a risk to this function. This independence
might be granted by the corporation in exchange for a preference
from the FCC in licensing decisions.252 Of course, the funding for
any such investigative division would have to be either
continuously supplied by the parent corporation or subsidized by
the government. Investigative reporters will not investigate too
hard if what they find will result in the loss of their jobs or even a
reduction in their salaries.253 The government might use the
does it promote localism, diversity and competition to allow, as we will
allow by our action today, more media concentration in the more than
175 markets with over 90 percent of the American population?
Id.
251

See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 93, at 217-18 (discussing the FCC
licensing practice in the past of considering to what extent management of a
television station will be directly supervised by its owners). Whereas the FCC
used to look at centralized control by ownership as an indicator of viewpoint
diversity, the changed circumstances of media ownership today might require
the opposite; viewpoint diversity might be best advanced by requiring station
owners (frequently large national and international corporations) to let local
station management retain editorial control of the station.
253
The effects of the ability to terminate or otherwise determine
compensation on the performance of one’s job are almost too obvious to need
citation. See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)
(noting that “it is quite evident that one who holds his office only during the
pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of
252
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revenue supplied by spectrum license auctions to subsidize these
functions (or to fund independent, non-commercial, nongovernmental investigative journalism entities).254 Until these or
other preventative measures have been discussed and provided for,
however, there is no compelling reason to risk these dangers.
E. The Next Step
It seems clear that the FCC’s refusal to exercise its broad
discretion to maintain broadcast ownership rules can be traced to a
laissez-faire perspective among a majority of the Commission.
Commissioner Abernathy, in her statement explaining her decision
to support the deregulatory June 2 decision, gave other reasons for
her refusal to support the existing regulations.255 She stated that,
while she recognized that those opposing deregulation had valid
arguments,256 she was unwilling to oppose deregulation based on
unsubstantiated “fears” that dangerous levels of media
consolidation would result.257 This low valuation of the threat to
viewpoint diversity posed by consolidation is consistent with the
view that regulation of broadcast ownership should be placed to a

independence against the latter’s will”); Mill, supra note 1, at 31 (“[M]en might
as well be imprisoned as excluded from the means of earning their bread.”).
254
See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 78, at 242-44 (discussing spectrum
auctions as a means of awarding broadcast licences in a deregulated media
environment); COOPER, supra note 4, at 19 (including “government subsidized
noncommercial media” [i.e. public broadcasting] in a suggested system of
diverse media organizations).
255
See Statement of Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy (June 2, 2003),
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-127A4.doc.
256
Id. at 4 (stating that “we should recognize that these are in fact issues on
which reasonable people may disagree,” referring to differing viewpoints on
what level of regulation is required).
257
Id. Commissioner Abernathy boldly asserted that “[the FCC’s] decisions
were based on facts rather than fears,” and that she was not very concerned of
the deleterious effects of deregulation on viewpoint diversity because, “it is
simply not possible to monopolize the flow of information in today’s world.
Indeed, the fall of Communism in the 1980’s and of military dictatorships in the
1990’s shows that diverse viewpoints cannot be suppressed even by
authoritarian governments, much less by private media companies.” Id.
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large extent in the hands of a free market.258
But limiting government involvement in broadcast regulation
to merely preventing levels of concentration that violate antitrust
concerns will not provide the level of viewpoint diversity to which
the public is entitled. Therefore, because Commissioner
Abernathy’s priorities currently govern the FCC’s thinking, redress
of any concerns over the threat deregulation poses must be sought
elsewhere.
It is possible for citizens to petition Congress, and indeed,
congressional opposition to the June 2 vote was motivated at least
in part by the unprecedented outcry from the public.259 The latest
developments, however, seem to indicate that Congress will
largely fail in its resolve to fully reverse the new FCC rules.260
Nevertheless, the public may yet find redress in the courts. In
upholding the Local Ownership Order against a challenge on First
258

See supra Part I.E-F (discussing the law and economics school and its
effects over the past twenty years on broadcast regulation). Whether because of
an unbounded faith in the free market (like former FCC Commissioner Fowler),
supra note 30, or because of the lack of definitive proof of harms likely to flow
from media consolidation (like current Commissioner Abernathy), it is evident
that some people will not be convinced of the dangers of media consolidation
until such consolidation occurs and harms therefrom are present in our everyday
lives. Such a view is unfortunate, especially from those in public service, in light
of the recognized difficulty in undoing consolidation once it has occurred. See
Richmond Hearing, supra note 159, at 37. “Further media consolidation can’t
easily be undone. Once the toothpaste is out of the tube, it’s going to be difficult,
if not impossible to put it back in.” Id.
259
See Paul Davidson, FCC Media Rule Changes Still in Flux, USA
TODAY, June 2, 2003, at 1B (“The FCC has gotten an unprecedented 500,000 or
so comments, mostly from critics.”).
260
See Stephen Labaton, Court Is Urged to Change Media Ownership
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at C14. Originally, Congress had attached a
provision to one of its 2004 spending measures that set the national audience
reach cap from the 45 percent ordered by the FCC on June 2 back to 35 percent,
the pre-June 2 level. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. After negotiations
with the Bush administration, however, the measure was passed allowing a
national audience reach of 39 percent. Labaton, supra, at C14. This agreed-upon
39 percent level is indicative of the influence the major networks wield in
Washington; it represents the current reach of the two largest networks, CBS
and Fox. Id.
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Amendment grounds, the Sinclair court found itself bound by the
Supreme Court’s recognition in NCCB that FCC ownership rules
“significantly further the First Amendment interest in a robust
exchange of viewpoints.”261 While the Supreme Court has thus far
fallen short of establishing an affirmative duty under the First
Amendment requiring government to prevent the decay of
viewpoint diversity in broadcast media,262 the Court continues to
provide a forum of last resort for those seeking to vindicate the
public’s interest in viewpoint diversity. The Fox decision, in
acknowledging that the arguments of intervenors on behalf of the
FCC formed part of the court’s decision to remand the NTSO rule
rather than vacate it, suggests that citizen participation in lawsuits
of this type can make a difference.263
CONCLUSION
Since its establishment in 1934, the FCC has held a great deal
of power to manage the airwaves in the interests of the American
public. Nothing in the recent D.C. Court of Appeals decisions in
Fox and Sinclair removed any of this power. Nevertheless, a
deregulatory-minded FCC used these decisions as something of a
judicial scapegoat to hook its laissez-faire political agenda to. At
261

Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 168 (2002). See
supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing the recognition in Fox and
Sinclair that the scarcity doctrine is alive and well).
262
Although an affirmative duty to provide some minimum level of
viewpoint diversity has never been raised by the Supreme Court, it has been
discussed in legal scholarship. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986). Fiss argues that the growing influence
of the dominant economic actors in society on public debate might become
destructive to the public’s interest in rich public debate. Id. at 1410. In that
event, Fiss contends, the First Amendment might require the Supreme Court “to
do all that it can possibly do to support and encourage the state in efforts to
enrich public debate. . .if need be, even to require the state to continue and
embark on programs that enrich debate.” Id. at 1424.
263
See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1052-53 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (citing intervenors’ arguments in favor of maintaining the NTSO rule
as one of the reasons for not vacating the rule); see supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
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most, Fox and Sinclair represent the view of one United States
Court of Appeals that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 holds
the FCC to a higher standard of justification for their rules. But the
cases do not reflect, as the FCC suggests, an outright reduction of
the broad authority the FCC has traditionally held to protect
important public interests such as viewpoint diversity in broadcast
TV regulation. By elevating entertainment over information
dissemination, the new rules unwisely put the public interest at risk
in exchange for benefits that are speculative and, even were they
certain, not worth the likely harms to our democracy. It now
remains for citizens, individually and collectively in civic
organizations, to remind the FCC of its seemingly forgotten duty to
promulgate rules that protect our society’s requirement of broad,
robust, and antagonistic public debate. This admittedly amorphous
but nonetheless essential characteristic of our democracy should
not be further sacrificed in the name of corporate media’s profits.
If necessary, Friends should be sacrificed first.

